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The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment
HENRY S. NOYES
For the second time in twenty-five years, personal jurisdiction has perplexed the U.S.
Supreme Court. The problem is purposeful availment. All of the Justices agree that
specific jurisdiction does not exist without purposeful availment, but the Court could not
cobble together a majority opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro to clarify
what purposeful availment means or what it requires.
This Article sets forth a simple—yet meaningful and necessary—solution. Purposeful
availment is best understood by its negative: no court should find a nonresident defendant
subject to personal jurisdiction for a contact with the forum state that the defendant could
not reasonably prevent. Put another way, where it is not reasonably feasible for a
defendant to sever its connection with the state, purposeful availment does not exist.
Conversely, where it is reasonably feasible for a defendant to prevent its contact with a
state but it has not done so, there is presumptively purposeful availment and, subject to the
fairness balancing, specific jurisdiction.
This principle is consistent with the understanding reached by the Court more than
twenty-five years ago and shared by a majority of the current Justices that personal
jurisdiction is an individual liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause.
Because it is an individual liberty interest, the purposeful availment requirement must be
applied in such a manner that an economic actor can structure its conduct so as to avoid
subjecting itself to jurisdiction in a disfavored forum.
Application of this principle leads to clear, but certain to be controversial, resolution
of several questions left unresolved by the Court in McIntyre v. Nicastro. It also makes
clear that Nicastro itself was wrongly decided. First, component part manufacturers
generally do not control the distribution and point of sale of the end product into which
their component part is incorporated. Thus, absent some additional conduct targeting the
forum state, component part manufacturers do not purposefully avail themselves of a
particular state where the end product is sold, even where there is a regular flow of a large
quantum of the component parts into that state. Second, end product manufacturers retain
nearly complete control over the initial point of sale of their products. Thus, an end
product manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of every state where the product is
sold to consumers—even where the manufacturer sold the product to a distributor who sold
the product to a retailer who sold the product to a consumer. Third, a manufacturer who
markets its product nationwide has purposefully availed itself of every state where the
product is sold and causes injury.
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The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment
HENRY S. NOYES*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court decided two personal jurisdiction cases in 2011.
One of the two was a specific jurisdiction case—J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro1—that focused on purposeful availment. This is not
surprising because the issue of whether a state court may properly exercise
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who did not consent to
jurisdiction and who was not present in that state arises frequently in all
types of litigation.2 What is surprising is that it took so long for the Court
to consider the issue despite the fact that the rules and standards for
specific jurisdiction—and, in particular, what constitutes purposeful
availment—have long remained unclear.
Prior to the two personal jurisdiction cases that the Supreme Court
promulgated in 2011, it had been nearly twenty-five years since the
Supreme Court last considered whether a state court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has no physical presence in
the forum jurisdiction.3 That decision, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court,4 did not result in a majority opinion. All nine Justices
agreed that the Due Process Clause governed the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, that the Due Process Clause required analysis of the
defendant’s contact with California (the forum state), and that the
defendant’s contact with California was not relevant unless such contact
was the result of defendant’s purposeful availment of California.5 But the
Justices disagreed sharply regarding the appropriate standard for
determining whether a defendant’s contact with the forum state rises to the
level of purposeful availment and whether the defendant in Asahi had, by
*
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. This paper benefitted from feedback
from my colleagues at a presentation at Chapman. I thank Shana, Charlie and Edie for their support.
1
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
2
Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion); see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Map out of the Personal
Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 531 (1995) (“[T]he threshold determination of
personal jurisdiction has become one of the most litigated issues in state and federal courts . . . .”).
3
The Supreme Court has considered only one other major personal jurisdiction case in the last
twenty-five years. In that 1990 decision, the Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
California court over a nonresident, natural-person defendant who was validly served with process
while physically located in California. Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 607, 627–28 (1990).
4
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
5
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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its conduct, purposefully availed itself of California. Thus, Asahi did little
to clarify the rules and standards for determining when a state does or does
not have jurisdiction over an absent defendant.7 The passage of time has
only amplified the lack of clarity. The lower courts have not reached a
consensus about the meaning and application of “purposeful availment”
and, of the nine Justices who participated in Asahi, only Justice Scalia
remains on the Supreme Court today.
For those expecting some clarity regarding the rules and standards for
specific jurisdiction, especially regarding the meaning and application of
the purposeful availment requirement, Nicastro is a disappointment.8
Nicastro did not result in a majority opinion. Instead, the Justices split
four-two-three. Six Justices agreed that the defendant did not purposefully
avail itself of the forum state and that personal jurisdiction was therefore
improper, but the Justices again split sharply in their reasoning.9 What, if
anything, can we learn from Nicastro? The result in Nicastro was not
surprising in that it was arguably consistent with existing precedent. But
the various opinions in Nicastro reveal a great deal about the views of the
current Supreme Court Justices regarding personal jurisdiction. Justice
Kennedy—writing for Justices Thomas and Scalia and Chief Justice
Roberts—wants to establish a new, more rigorous approach to personal
jurisdiction that would limit the number of defendants who may be sued in
state courts and would eliminate the fairness analysis as redundant.10
Justice Ginsburg—joined in her dissent by Justices Kagan and
6

See id.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (plurality opinion) (“The rules and standards for determining when
a State does or does not have jurisdiction over an absent party have been unclear because of decadesold questions left open in Asahi . . . .”).
8
See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum
Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (describing the Court’s opinion in J.
McIntyre as “a disaster” and stating that the Court “performed miserably”); see also John N. Drobak,
Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031301 (“The finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction in Nicastro is the
worst result in any personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court in the modern era.”); Allan
Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 345 (2012) (stating that the three McIntyre opinions
“exacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal confusion” and that each opinion “demonstrated a
disappointing level of judicial competence”); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s Sovereignty Got to Do
with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012)
(“Personal jurisdiction . . . seems to inspire foolish remarks and poor opinions, and Nicastro, may set a
new low in that regard.”); Michael Richards, Whose Due Process?, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (Oct. 4,
2011), http://www.nyujll.com/2011/10/whose-due-process.html (“J. McIntyre actually worsens the
state of affairs and further confuses the jurisdictional analysis not only by failing to offer a clear
framework for courts to use but also by introducing substantial uncertainty about the basic nature of the
due process question to be answered.”).
9
See infra Part IV.
10
See discussion infra Part VI.A.
7
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Sotomayor—wants to extend the personal jurisdiction doctrine to subject a
foreign defendant to suit in a forum state court when it targets the U.S. (in
its entirety) as a market and its product is sold in the forum state.11 Justice
Breyer—joined concurring in the judgment by Justice Alito—rejected
Justice Kennedy’s view, but indicated that he was not yet willing to join
Justice Ginsburg.12 Before resolving the issue of purposeful availment,
Justice Breyer wants to wait for a case that requires the Court to confront
the “many recent changes in commerce and communication.”13
A careful parsing of the various Nicastro opinions provides significant
guidance to state and federal trial courts struggling to resolve personal
jurisdiction issues. Several established principles remain valid. The
exercise of personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause,
which still requires analysis of the defendant’s contact with the forum
state, and such contact is still not relevant unless it was the result of the
defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum state.
We also learned that a majority of the Court appears to accept the
views expressed in each of the three Asahi opinions as valid proof of
purposeful availment for an end product manufacturer. Thus, an end
product manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of the forum state
when the plaintiff can establish either of the following two circumstances:
(1) the defendant had a “regular flow” or “regular course” of product sales
in the forum state, rather than a small number of isolated sales;14 or (2) the
defendant purposefully targeted forum state customers which would
include “special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing” or
other similar targeting activity directed toward the forum state or its
customers.15
Where does that leave us on the meaning and application of purposeful
availment? In this Article, I argue that purposeful availment can best be
understood by its negative. In the Court’s opinion in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,16 Justice White wrote that a corporation
that purposefully avails itself of a particular state “has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to
customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State.”17
It is not always feasible, however, for a corporation to sever its
11

See discussion infra Part VI.B.
See discussion infra Part VI.C.
13
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
14
See discussion infra Part V.B.
15
See id.
16
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
17
Id. at 297.
12
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connection to a state. Sometimes a corporation has no ability to control
whether a product reaches a particular state. Where it is not reasonably
feasible18 to prevent the contact with the forum state, purposeful
availment—and therefore specific jurisdiction—does not exist.
Conversely, where it is reasonably feasible for a nonresident defendant to
sever its connection to a state but it has not done so, there is presumptively
purposeful availment of that state.
For example, a small manufacturer of cups and saucers located in West
Virginia who makes sales exclusively from its West Virginia shop cannot
prevent its cups and saucers from ending up in Hawaii.19 A resident of
Hawaii might visit West Virginia, or a resident of West Virginia might
purchase a set of cups and saucers to send as a wedding gift to a relative in
Hawaii. It is not reasonably feasible for the West Virginia manufacturer to
“sever” such ties to Hawaii and thus there is no purposeful availment—
even if the purchaser told the manufacturer at the time of the sale, “I can’t
wait to send these lovely cups and saucers to my cousin in Hawaii!” By
contrast, there is purposeful availment for a single sale made to a Hawaii
resident who, in response to an ad placed in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser
by the West Virginia manufacturer, calls a toll-free telephone number,
purchases the cups and saucers with a credit card, and arranges for the
manufacturer to ship them to Hawaii. The West Virginia manufacturer
could have prevented this contact with Hawaii but did not.
These are the relatively easy cases. Even the cases that have been
difficult for the Court—where there is an intervening distributor, for
example—are best understood by considering whether it is reasonably
feasible for a defendant to prevent its contact with the forum state. For
example, component part manufacturers generally do not control the
distribution and point of sale of the end product into which their
component part is incorporated. For the component part manufacturer, the
target “consumer” is the end product manufacturer. Thus, absent some
additional conduct targeting the forum state, component part manufacturers
do not purposefully avail themselves of a particular state, even where there
is a regular flow of a large quantum of the component parts into that state.
This conclusion will limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and insulate,
to a degree, component part manufacturers from liability.
End product manufacturers, on the other hand, retain nearly complete
18
By “reasonably feasible,” I mean something that is literally possible to achieve and also is
economically and technologically practical given the circumstances.
19
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an
equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a
large distributor, who resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).”).
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control over the point of sale of their products. Thus, an end product
manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of every state where the
product is sold to consumers—even where the manufacturer sold the
product to a distributor, who sold the product to a retailer, who, in turn,
sold the product to a consumer. This conclusion will greatly expand the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over end product manufacturers,
particularly foreign end product manufacturers.
Likewise, the Court must adopt Justice Ginsburg’s position that a
manufacturer who markets its product to the entire United States has
purposefully availed itself of every state where the product is sold and
subsequently causes injury.20 It is a simple matter for a manufacturer to
avoid marketing its product in certain undesirable states. Therefore, it
defies reason and reality to conclude that a manufacturer who seeks to sell
its product in every state has not purposefully availed itself of any state.
This analysis is consistent with the notion that personal jurisdiction is
an individual interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. This
interest can be waived both before and after litigation arises.21 An
objection to personal jurisdiction can also be forfeited or waived by an
inattentive or careless defendant after litigation commences. Because
personal jurisdiction is an individual liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause, it must be applied in such a manner that it fosters “a
degree of predictability to the legal system” that makes it reasonably
feasible for careful and assiduous “potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct” so as to avoid purposeful availment of disfavored
forums.22
This analysis also confirms that Nicastro was wrongly decided for two
independent reasons. First, the United Kingdom end product manufacturer
had control over the distribution of its product and easily could have
avoided distribution in New Jersey. Second, the manufacturer also
marketed its product in the entirety of the United States, thus hoping for
sales in New Jersey and every other state.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A complete history of the development of the law of personal
jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article. A brief overview of the
development of the law of personal jurisdiction is necessary, however, to
identify and separate those issues that were settled from those that were
20
See id. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under past Supreme Court
jurisprudence, a manufacturer who markets its product to the entire United States is subject to personal
jurisdiction in every state where the product is sold); see also discussion infra Part VIII.F.
21
See discussion infra Part VII (discussing how courts will need to assess objections to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants).
22
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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unsettled as the Court considered Nicastro.
A. Territoriality
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the Due Process Clause protects a defendant against a
state court’s exercise of power over that defendant unless the state court
has personal jurisdiction over that defendant.23 The Supreme Court
initially grounded personal jurisdiction on a theory of “exclusive power
based on territoriality: each state sovereign had jurisdiction, exclusive of
all other sovereigns’ jurisdiction, to bind persons and things present within
its territorial boundaries.”24
Absent the defendant’s consent to
jurisdiction,25 the defendant’s presence within the territory of the forum
state was a prerequisite to that state court’s obtaining a judgment against
the defendant.26
B. The International Shoe Minimum Contacts Test
In its seminal 1945 decision International Shoe Co. v. Washington,27
the Supreme Court abandoned its then-existing test—“is the defendant
physically in the state”—in favor of a test that focuses on the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction in the light of the relationship
between the defendant and the forum state.28 Although still a Due Process
issue, the International Shoe test of personal jurisdiction is based on a
conceptual scheme with two prongs: (1) contact between the defendant and
the forum state; and (2) fairness.29 The test asks whether a nonresident
defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that
the exercise of jurisdiction would not “offend traditional notions of fair

23
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977).
24
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.2 at 214 (2d ed. 2009); see also
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established.”); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.2
at 100–01 (4th ed. 2005). Personal jurisdiction is sometimes referred to, even today, as “territorial
jurisdiction.” Id. § 3.1 at 99 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 55 (1982)).
25
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.5 at 106–07.
26
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733).
27
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
28
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (describing International Shoe as
“the seminal case” and noting that the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence “ha[s]
abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s ‘presence’ within a State in favor of a
more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State”).
29
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4.4 at 81 (2d ed. 2009); CLERMONT, supra note 24,
§ 4.2 at 212 (“[D]ue process dictates both that the forum must have power over the target of the action
and that litigating the action there must be reasonable.”).
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play and substantial justice.”
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court distinguished between the
concepts of “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction.”31 The
Supreme Court recently reiterated this distinction in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,32 a “general jurisdiction” case that was
argued and decided on the same date as Nicastro. General jurisdiction
exists when a defendant engages in substantial in-state activity that is
“continuous and systematic.”33 When a court has “general jurisdiction”
over a defendant, the defendant may be sued in the forum state even where
the lawsuit is wholly unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state.34 For example, an individual may be sued in his or her domicile
state, while a corporation may be sued either in its state of incorporation or
in the state where it has its principal place of business—even if the events
giving rise to the lawsuit have nothing to do with the forum state.35 By
contrast, adjudicatory authority is “specific” when the lawsuit arises out of
or derives from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.36 Where a
court determines that it has “specific jurisdiction” over a defendant, it
means that specific action can proceed in that court. It does not mean that
that defendant can be sued in that forum generally—that is, for other
matters unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.37
The Nicastro decision and this Article focus on specific jurisdiction.
In particular, I consider the rules and standards for the exercise of
jurisdiction over (1) a nonresident defendant (2) who is not present (and
therefore not served with process) in the forum state and (3) has neither
consented to jurisdiction nor (4) waived or forfeited the objection to
jurisdiction. This is the factual scenario where the International Shoe test
applies and the forum court must evaluate the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state and the fairness of forcing an unwilling defendant to litigate in
a foreign forum.
Under the International Shoe test, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a relevant contact. The defendant bears the burden of
30

30

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 318 (“While it has been held . . . that continuous activity of some sorts within a state
is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity,
there have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.” (citations omitted)).
32
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
33
Id. at 2853.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).
37
Id. at 2851.
31
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establishing the constitutional unfairness of the forum.
Absent
establishment of a relevant contact, the issue of fairness is irrelevant. “No
matter how overwhelming the showing of fairness in the forum might be,
there can be no jurisdiction without an initial finding that the defendant has
a relevant contact with the forum.”39
Not all of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are relevant. A
relevant contact must involve “purposeful availment”: the defendant’s
conduct must be intentionally directed toward the forum state.40
Serendipitous contacts between the defendant and the forum state do not
count. For example, the unilateral act of the plaintiff taking defendant’s
product into the forum state does not constitute purposeful availment.
Likewise, a contact is relevant only if the contact makes it foreseeable that
the defendant might eventually be sued in the forum state as a result of its
conduct directed toward the state.41
Simply identifying a relevant contact is not the end of the inquiry. The
International Shoe test requires a balancing of “minimum contacts” against
fairness. The minimum contacts portion of the test assesses both the
quantity of contacts and the “quality” of contacts between the defendant
and the forum state.42 The greater the quantity of relevant contacts, the
more likely that jurisdiction will be appropriate. The higher the “quality”
of the relevant contacts, the more likely that jurisdiction will be proper.
The “quality” of a contact with the forum state is determined by its
relationship to the facts that give rise to the underlying lawsuit. And the
“quality” of the contacts is more important than the quantity.
“International Shoe Co. v. Washington made the point that as the level of
the defendant’s state-directed activity increases, the state’s constitutional
power extends to claims less related to that activity.”43 Even a single
contact, however, will constitute “minimum contacts” sufficient to support
the exercise of personal jurisdiction when the contact with the forum state
is the very basis for the action.44
38
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); CLERMONT, supra note 24,
§ 4.2 at 212; FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 85.
39
FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 80; see also FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.11 at
135–36 (4th ed. 2005); Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic
Influence of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 552 (2012) (“Only if a defendant-initiated contact is
established will a court consider the fairness and reasonableness of jurisdiction.”).
40
Freer, supra note 39, at 561 (“[I]f there is no contact caused by purposeful availment, there can
be no jurisdiction.”).
41
FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 81; FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.11 at 139–41.
42
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.10 at 128–29.
43
CLERMONT, supra note 24, § 4.2 at 223; see also id. §4.2 at 229 (“[A]n increase in
unrelatedness requires a higher level of activity.”); FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.3 at 72–73 (discussing
same).
44
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (stating that, over time, courts had
established that certain minimum contacts—such as “consent,” “presence,” and
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If the plaintiff establishes the requisite minimum contacts, then the
burden switches to the defendant to establish unfairness—that it would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to require this
defendant to litigate in this forum. The Court has identified five relevant
factors to the fairness analysis. The (1) burden on the nonresident
defendant of litigating in the forum is balanced against: (2) the forum
state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution possible; and (5)
“the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”45
III. THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
The Supreme Court first discussed the concept of purposeful availment
in its 1958 decision Hanson v. Denckla.46 Hanson involved a Delaware
corporate defendant who had established a trust in 1935 for Mrs. Donner, a
Pennsylvania resident, and who then acted as trustee.47 In 1944, Mrs.
Donner moved to Florida, where she remained until her death in 1952.48
When litigation regarding the trust ensued in Florida state court, the
defendant objected to personal jurisdiction.49 The Supreme Court agreed
with the defendant and held that the unilateral activity of a plaintiff or nonparty does not satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts with the forum
state.50 The Court wrote that “it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”51
The Court later clarified:
This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.
Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts
“doing business”—permitted courts to exercise personal jurisdiction when the contact with the forum
state is the very basis of the action); Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352, 353–56 (1927) (permitting a
Massachusetts agent to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania resident where the motor
vehicle accident in question occurred in Massachusetts itself); FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.3 at 72–73;
id. § 2.4.4 at 74–76; FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 24, § 3.10 at 128.
45
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
46
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
47
Id. at 238.
48
Id. at 239.
49
Id. at 250.
50
Id. at 253.
51
Id.
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proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a substantial connection with the forum state.52
Still, the meaning and application of the purposeful availment requirement
has given rise to frustration in the courts, and among academics and
practitioners alike. To understand the divergent views of the Supreme
Court Justices, it helps to review the Supreme Court’s most recent (preNicastro) decisions.
A. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,53 the plaintiffs brought
a products liability action in Oklahoma state court.54 The plaintiffs had
purchased a new Audi automobile from defendant Seaway Volkswagen,
Inc., a local car dealership in Massena, New York.55 One year after the
purchase, the plaintiffs left their New York home for a new home in
Arizona.56 The plaintiffs were driving their Audi through Oklahoma on the
way to Arizona when they were rear-ended by another car and injured in
the resulting fire.57 The plaintiffs sued the local New York dealership
(Seaway) where they had purchased the car and the regional distributor
(World-Wide Volkswagen).58 World-Wide and Seaway then entered
special appearances to argue that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
the Oklahoma state court would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.59
Both Seaway and World-Wide were incorporated and had their
respective principal places of business in New York. 60 Although both
companies had contractual relationships with the manufacturer and
importer of the plaintiffs’ Audi, they were fully independent
corporations.61 Neither Seaway nor World-Wide “d[id] any business in
Oklahoma, ship[ped] or s[old] any products to or in that State, ha[d] an
agent to receive process there, or purchase[d] advertisements in any media
calculated to reach Oklahoma.”62 In fact, there was no evidence “that any
automobile sold by World-[W]ide or Seaway ha[d] ever entered Oklahoma
52
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
53
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
54
Id. at 288.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. Plaintiffs also sued the German manufacturer (Audi) and the U.S. importer (Volkswagen of
America), but neither of those defendants contested personal jurisdiction. Id.
60
Id. at 288–89.
61
Id. at 289.
62
Id.
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with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the present case.”63
The Oklahoma state court nevertheless rejected the defendants’ argument
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the defendants’ writ petition,64
because “the product being sold and distributed by the petitioners is by its
very design and purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible
use in Oklahoma” and “petitioners derive substantial income from
automobiles which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma.”65
In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.66 The Court
reaffirmed the principle that a state court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if (1) there “exist minimum
contacts between the defendant and the forum State” and (2) “maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”67 According to the Court, determining whether maintenance of
the suit would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
is a test of reasonableness or fairness.68
The Court noted that the “limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the
Due Process Clause, in its role as guarantor against inconvenient litigation,
have been substantially relaxed over the years” due largely to the increase
in interstate and international commerce and the availability and
affordability of modern communication and transportation.69 The Court
nevertheless held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case
would be inappropriate because the defendants “carr[ied] on no activity
whatsoever in Oklahoma.”70
The Court acknowledged that “an automobile is mobile by its very
design and purpose” and it was therefore foreseeable that the plaintiffs’
automobile would be driven to Oklahoma and cause injury there.71 The
Court held, however, that the defendants’ product being placed by the
defendants in the “stream-of-commerce” and taken to Oklahoma through
the unilateral act of the plaintiffs, although foreseeable, did not warrant the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.72 The
Court noted that a finding of jurisdiction would frustrate the ability of
“potential defendants to structure their primary conduct” so as to avoid suit
in Oklahoma and other jurisdictions.73
63
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 355 (Okla. 1978), rev’d, 444 U.S.
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Id. at 354.
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 299.
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Id. at 291–92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 292.
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The Court limited the scope of its holding by noting that the
defendants did not seek to serve the Oklahoma market either directly or
indirectly.74 Although a number of Volkswagen service centers were
located in Oklahoma, the defendants did not own or operate these service
centers and they earned no direct revenue from the service centers. The
Court described this as a “collateral relation” to Oklahoma that did “not
stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with that State.”75
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the defendants “purposefully
inject[ed] the [Audi] into the stream of interstate commerce” and the Audi
was then “predictably used in the forum State.”76 Justice Marshall (joined
by Justice Blackmun) also dissented, arguing that jurisdiction was proper
because it was based “on the deliberate and purposeful actions of the
defendants themselves in choosing to become part of a nationwide, indeed
a global, network for marketing and servicing automobiles.”77
B. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
Seven years later, the Court revisited the issue of specific jurisdiction.
Like World-Wide Volkswagen, Asahi Metal Industry, Co. v. Superior
Court,78 involved a product liability claim resulting from a vehicle
collision. There, the plaintiff lost control of his motorcycle and collided
with a tractor, injuring the plaintiff and killing his passenger wife.79 The
plaintiff filed a product liability action in California state court, alleging
that his motorcycle’s tire, tube and sealant were defective.80 The plaintiff
sued several defendants, including component parts manufacturer Cheng
Shin Rubber Industrial Co, Ltd. (Cheng Shin), who was the Taiwanese
manufacturer of the tube.81 Cheng Shin then filed a cross-complaint
seeking indemnification from another component part manufacturer, Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the tube’s
valve assembly. The plaintiff later settled and dismissed all of his claims.
As a result, the only remaining claim for the California state court to
resolve was the Taiwanese company’s claim for indemnity against the
Japanese company.82
California’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction to
the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution.83 Asahi moved
74

Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 298–99.
76
Id. at 306–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 105.
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to quash the service of summons on the grounds that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by the California state court was inconsistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 Asahi was a
Japanese corporation that had no offices, property, or agents in California
and it solicited no business and had no direct sales in California.85 Asahi
manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan and sold them to Cheng Shin
and other tire manufacturers. Cheng Shin also purchased valve assemblies
from other manufacturers. Asahi’s sales to Cheng Shin took place in
Taiwan. Cheng Shin incorporated the valve assemblies it purchased from
Asahi and other valve assembly manufacturers into tire tubes manufactured
in Taiwan.86
Cheng Shin bought a significant number of valve assemblies—
approximately 1,350,000 over a five-year period—from Asahi, but these
sales were a small part of Cheng Shin’s overall business.87 Cheng Shin
estimated that approximately twenty percent of its sales in the United
States were in California, but the record did not indicate what percentage
of Cheng Shin’s total sales were made to the United States.88 In an
informal survey of one cycle store in California, an attorney for Cheng
Shin determined that the store contained 115 tire tubes. Of those 115
tubes, 21 contained Asahi valve stems and 12 of the 21 Asahi valve stems
were incorporated in Cheng Shin tire tubes.89 An affidavit of a manager of
Cheng Shin responsible for purchasing component parts stated:
In discussions with Asahi regarding the purchase of valve
stem assemblies the fact that [Cheng Shin] sells tubes
throughout the world and specifically the United States has
been discussed. I am informed and believe that Asahi was
fully aware that valve stem assemblies sold to my Company
and to others would end up throughout the United States and
in California.90
The president of Asahi, by contrast, declared that Asahi had “never
contemplated that its limited sales of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan
would subject it to lawsuits in California.”91
The California Superior Court denied the motion to quash, stating:
“Asahi obviously does business on an international scale. It is not
unreasonable that they defend claims of defect in their product on an
84

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
Id. at 106–08.
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Id. at 106–07.
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Id. at 106.
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Id.
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international scale.”
The California Court of Appeal disagreed,
concluding that “it would be unreasonable to require Asahi to respond in
California solely on the basis of ultimately realized foreseeability that the
product into which its component was embodied would be sold all over the
world including California.”93 The California Supreme Court agreed with
the superior court and concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
was proper because “Asahi knew that some of the valve assemblies sold to
Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in California, and
that Asahi benefited indirectly from the sale in California of products
incorporating its components.”94
All nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court voted to reverse, finding
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the Due Process
Clause.95 Eight Justices signed on to Part II.B. of Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, which concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Asahi would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”96 The only remaining parties to the action were a Japanese
corporation and a Taiwanese corporation. The indemnification claim arose
from a transaction that took place in Taiwan. The burden on defendant
Asahi to defend an action in a foreign legal system was great. The
interests of Cheng Shin and the California court in exercising personal
jurisdiction over Asahi were minimal.97 In addition, the Court made
special note of the policy implications given the international context of
the dispute:
92

The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a
state court’s assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant
will differ from case to case. In every case, however, those
interests, as well as the Federal Government’s interest in its
foreign relations policies, will be best served by a careful
inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction
in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious
burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.98
The Justices could not agree, however, whether Asahi had established
minimum contacts with California necessary to satisfy that portion of the
personal jurisdiction test. Justice O’Connor—joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia—wrote a plurality opinion that
92

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
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focused on the concept of purposeful availment.
Justice O’Connor
emphasized that minimum contacts with the jurisdiction only counted if
they were based on an act of the defendant bringing its products to the
forum state with the expectation that they would be purchased by
consumers in the forum state—as opposed to serendipitous or fortuitous
contact with the jurisdiction based on “a consumer’s unilateral act of
bringing the defendant’s product into the forum State.”100
The mere act of manufacturing a product and placing it “in the stream
of commerce” where it might eventually be swept into the forum state is
not enough to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.101 Instead, the
O’Connor plurality indicated that the contact with the forum state “must
come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum State.”102 This would include:
99

[A]n intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State,
for example, designing the product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.
But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce
may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream
into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.103
The O’Connor plurality concluded that Cheng Shin failed to
“demonstrate[] any action by Asahi to purposefully avail itself of the
California market.”104
The Brennan plurality concurred in the result—based on the
conclusion that it would be unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction in this
instance—but disagreed with the O’Connor plurality about the
“interpretation . . . of the stream-of-commerce theory” and “the conclusion
that Asahi did not ‘purposefully avail itself of the California market.’”105
Justice Brennan concluded that the Court’s decision in World-Wide
Volkswagen distinguished between the circumstance where a consumer
99

Id. at 109–13 (plurality opinion).
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101
Id. at 110.
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unilaterally and fortuitously transported a defendant’s product to the forum
state and one in which the defendant’s product was regularly sold in the
forum state through an established chain of distribution.106 On this point,
Justice Brennan stated:
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents
or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products
from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is
being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit
there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation
present a burden for which there is no corresponding benefit.
A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of
commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the
final product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from
the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial
activity. These benefits accrue regardless of whether that
participant directly conducts business in the forum State, or
engages in additional conduct directed toward that State.107
Justice Stevens also concurred in the result, but wrote separately
(joined by two other Justices) to state that the fact alone that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair required reversal.108
Although he therefore found it unnecessary for the O’Connor plurality to
“articulate ‘purposeful direction’ or any other test as the nexus between an
act of a defendant and the forum State that is necessary to establish
minimum contacts,” he concluded that the O’Connor plurality had
misapplied that very test.109 Justice Stevens noted that “[w]hether or not
[Asahi’s] conduct r[ose] to the level of purposeful availment require[d] a
constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value and
the hazardous character of the components.”110 Asahi and Cheng Shin had
engaged in “a regular course of dealing that result[ed] in deliveries of over
100,000 units annually over a period of several years.111 This activity was,
for Justice Stevens, far more significant than simply placing a product in
the stream of commerce.112
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Id. at 119–20.
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IV. J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO
In September 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,113 a case whose facts would require
the Court to revisit its muddled jurisprudence regarding purposeful
availment.114 Nicastro involved a foreign manufacturer who placed its
product into the “stream of commerce” by selling it to a U.S. distributor
based in Ohio who then sold the product to a New Jersey business where it
ultimately injured a New Jersey resident in New Jersey.115
Plaintiff Robert Nicastro filed a products liability action in New Jersey
state court against the defendant J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (“J.
McIntyre”), a company incorporated in England and operating its principal
place of business there as well.116 Nicastro injured his hand at work in
New Jersey while running a metal-shearing machine that J. McIntyre had
manufactured in England.117 Following the defendant’s objection to the
New Jersey state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and subsequent
appeals, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the exercise of
jurisdiction was appropriate.
Jurisdictional discovery revealed that the “defendant does not have a
single contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question ending up
in this state.”118 Although one of the defendant’s machines ended up in
New Jersey, the defendant never marketed or shipped goods to New
Jersey.119 Instead, the offending machine was sold to the plaintiff’s New
Jersey employer by the defendant’s “exclusive American distributor,” a
separate company.120 The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that
the defendant had no “presence or minimum contacts in [New Jersey]—in
any jurisprudential sense—that would justify a New Jersey court to
exercise jurisdiction.”121 That court concluded, nevertheless, that “a
foreign manufacturer that places a defective product in the stream of
commerce through a distribution scheme that targets a national market,
which includes New Jersey, may be subject to the in personam jurisdiction
113

131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).
See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Clarifying Personal Jurisdiction . . . or Not, PRAWFSBLAWG
(June 28, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personaljurisdiction-or-not.html (“The Court granted cert in McIntyre to resolve a question that had been left
open 25 years ago in Asahi: whether putting a product into the stream of commerce expecting it to
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of a New Jersey court in a product-liability action.”
The defendant
designed and manufactured the product to conform to U.S. specifications
and engaged a distributor to market and distribute the machines to the
entire U.S. market.123 Thus, the defendant J. McIntyre knew or should
have known that its products would be sold and distributed to customers
located in each of the United States, including New Jersey.124
As in Asahi, all nine Supreme Court Justices agreed that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction was governed by the Due Process Clause, that the
Due Process Clause required analysis of the defendant’s contact with the
forum state, and that the defendant’s contact with the forum state was not
relevant unless such contact was the result of the defendant’s purposeful
availment of the forum state.125 The Supreme Court agreed on little else,
however, as the Justices—reminiscent of Asahi—split into three groups. In
a 4-2-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction
by New Jersey state courts over J. McIntyre was improper for an accident
that occurred in New Jersey and injured a New Jersey resident.126
122

V. NICASTRO DOES NOT BREAK NEW GROUND
A. International Shoe Provides the Appropriate “Test” and Requires
Purposeful Availment
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nicastro does not break much, if any,
new ground. None of the Justices suggested that any of the Supreme
Court’s existing personal jurisdiction precedent should be overturned. All
nine Justices agreed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was governed
by the Due Process Clause and that the International Shoe test provided the
appropriate analysis. All nine Justices analyzed the defendant’s contact
with the forum state and agreed that the contact was not relevant unless
such contact was the result of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the
forum state.
B. The Result in Nicastro Is Consistent with the Court’s Prior Precedent
Although there was significant disagreement about the application of
122
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the agreed-upon standard, the result in Nicastro is consistent with the
Court’s prior precedent.127 Nicastro involved a single, isolated product that
ended up in New Jersey. The defendant made no sales in New Jersey, had
no presence in New Jersey, had “no contacts with the state of New Jersey,”
did not directly sell or solicit business in New Jersey, and “had no
expectation that its product would be purchased and utilized in New
Jersey.”128 Under the Court’s World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi
decisions, the New Jersey court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant J.
McIntyre. There was only one contact with New Jersey and, although the
contact was the basis for the action against the defendant, there was no
purposeful availment because it was not part of a regular course of conduct
or dealing.129
The facts of Nicastro do not constitute purposeful availment pursuant
to Justice O’Connor’s Asahi plurality. The defendant did not target New
Jersey (other than as one of the fifty States). The sale of defendant’s
product in New Jersey was between the plaintiff’s employer and the nonparty distributor and did not “come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”130 As noted by Justice
Breyer, there was “no ‘something more,’ such as special state-related
design, advertising, advice, marketing, or anything else.”131
The facts of Nicastro also do not constitute purposeful availment
127
See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he outcome of this case is determined by our
precedents.”); id. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I would adhere strictly to our precedents and the
limited facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court.”); In re Chinese Mfrs. Drywall Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2012 WL 3815669, at *21 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2012) (“Justice Breyer’s
concurrence provides a clear directive to the Court to apply existing Supreme Court precedent on
specific personal jurisdiction and the stream–of–commerce doctrine.”). But see Drobak, supra note 8
(“Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the opinions in Nicastro is the claim by the concurrence that they
are doing ‘no more than adhering to our precedents.’” (footnote omitted)). For an argument that
purposeful availment should not be a constitutional requirement for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a non-U.S. defendant by a federal court, see generally Wendy Collins Perdue, Aliens, the Internet
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NW. U. L. REV. 455 (2004).
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marks omitted).
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2011),
http://www.nyujll.com/2011/11/purposeful-availment-and-commercial.html
[hereinafter
Richards, Purposeful Availment] (“Permitting New Jersey courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
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pursuant to Justice Brennan’s Asahi plurality. This was a single, isolated
product that ended up in New Jersey, rather than a “‘regular . . . flow’ or
‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey.”132 Purposeful availment was
lacking because defendant’s product was not regularly sold in the forum
state through a chain of distribution.133
The facts of Nicastro also do not constitute purposeful availment
pursuant to Justice Stevens’s Asahi concurrence. For Justice Stevens,
“[w]hether or not [the defendant’s] conduct rises to the level of purposeful
availment requires a constitutional determination that is affected by the
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the [defendant’s
products].”134 J. McIntyre produced a single product that ended up in New
Jersey. By contrast, Asahi had engaged in a “higher quantum of conduct”
as part of “a regular course of dealing that result[ed] in deliveries of over
100,000 units annually over a period of several years.”135 This activity
was, for Justice Stevens, far more than simply placing a product in the
stream of commerce.136
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg correctly pointed out the distinct
character of the product at issue—a $24,900 shearing machine used to
process recyclable metals. Justice Ginsberg stated:
[J. McIntyre’s] machine . . . is unlikely to sell in bulk
worldwide, much less in any given State. By dollar value,
the price of a single machine represents a significant sale.
Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of
flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the
Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit
in that State.137
Although the machine was expensive, it was a single product rather
than a regular course of dealing. This would be a departure from the
Court’s prior precedent. The Court rejected jurisdiction in World-Wide
Volkswagen—a case involving a single automobile—despite the fact that
automobiles are significant purchases that are priced comparably to the
$25,000 shearing machine in Nicastro.138
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the defendant foreign automobile
manufacturer in World-Wide Volkswagen—Audi—was subject to
132
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jurisdiction and, therefore, the defendant J. McIntyre should be subject to
the New Jersey court’s jurisdiction in Nicastro.139 Unlike J. McIntyre,
however, Audi did not object to jurisdiction.140 Furthermore, Audi was
selling thousands of automobiles throughout the United States, and
Volkswagen (which owned Audi) operated “an extensive chain of
Volkswagen service centers throughout the country, including some in
Oklahoma.”141 Thus, Audi was in a significantly different, and worse,
position than J. McIntyre. Even under Justice O’Connor’s Asahi plurality
opinion, Audi purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma by intentionally
directing its conduct there through sales, marketing, and services offered to
Oklahoma residents.
Justice Breyer’s concurrence noted that “[t]he Supreme Court of New
Jersey adopted a broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction
based on its view that ‘[t]he increasingly fast-paced globalization of the
world economy has removed national borders as barriers to trade.’”142
Justice Breyer determined, however, that the facts of the case did not
require the Court to consider changes to communications and international
commerce in order to resolve the dispute. He therefore concluded that the
outcome was determined by application of the Court’s existing
precedent.143 In particular, the defendant did not make any sales to New
Jersey and made only one sale to its distributor that ended up in New
Jersey. Justice Breyer cited World-Wide Volkswagen for the proposition
that “a single sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a
different State (where the accident takes place) is not a sufficient basis for
asserting jurisdiction.”144 He further cited the separate opinions in Asahi as
“strongly suggest[ing] that a single sale of a product in a State does not
constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of

139
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who dealt directly with the insured in selling a life insurance policy, the U.K. manufacturer retained a
U.S. distributor. Thus, McGee is distinguishable, but the distinction is unsatisfying given Justice
Breyer’s analysis.
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commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take place.”145
Justice Breyer expressed a willingness to consider a change in personal
jurisdiction law based on “relevant contemporary commercial
circumstances.”146 But Nicastro did not present such circumstances and
the result fit within existing precedent.
VI. NICASTRO’S INSIGHT ON THE CURRENT JUSTICES’ VIEWS ON
PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
A. Justice Kennedy’s Restrictive View of Purposeful Availment
1. Federalism Concerns Require Proof of Submission to Sovereign
Authority
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro is curious because he purported
to stay within the bounds of existing personal jurisdiction doctrine and
precedent, but a close look reveals that he sought to revisit (and shift) the
foundation of personal jurisdiction theory. Justice Kennedy began his
opinion by recognizing that Due Process is an “individual[] right.”147
Justice Kennedy also approved the basic International Shoe test148 and he
reaffirmed the requirement that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state
must result from purposeful availment.149 There is nothing new or
145
Id. Professor Allan Ides argues that Justice Breyer got it wrong when he concluded that J.
McIntyre fit within existing precedent. Ides, supra note 8, at 371–76. In particular he argues that
Justice Breyer’s conclusion is correct “only if adhering to precedents means revising those precedents
to fit the conclusion.” Id. at 376. Yet, Professor Ides’s conclusion is based on a disagreement about
how to read, interpret, and extend the three Asahi opinions to this new factual circumstance. See id. at
375 (“Justice Breyer simply and simplistically assumes that the language used by Justice Brennan to
describe the flow of products is freely transferrable to the sale of heavy industrial machinery.”). And
Professor Ides concedes that Justice Breyer’s argument is plausible. See id. (“It is just as plausible to
infer that Justice Stevens would uphold jurisdiction in a case involving the single sale (low volume) of
an expensive (high value) and dangerous (hazardous character) piece of industrial equipment as it is to
infer the opposite.”).
146
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).
147
Id. at 2786–87 (plurality opinion).
148
See id. at 2787.
149
See id. at 2790 (“These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not
show that J.McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”); id. at 2785 (“As a general
rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . .’”); id. at 2787 (“As a general rule, the
sovereign’s exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . .’”); id. (“In products liability cases like
this one, it is defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”); id. at 2789 (“Furthermore, were general fairness
considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where
carefully crafted judicial procedures could otherwise protect the defendant’s interests, or where the
plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign forum.”). Justice Kennedy
also affirms the basic principles of general jurisdiction and distinguishes general jurisdiction from the
specific jurisdiction issue involved in Nicastro. Id. at 2787.
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controversial there.
But early on Justice Kennedy made clear that he is not satisfied with
existing personal jurisdiction theory and he does not believe that personal
jurisdiction is, at its core, about individual rights or liberty. Rather, in his
view, personal jurisdiction is about federalism concerns—protecting and
maintaining the states’ sovereign authority. His opening discussion cited
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania150 for the proposition that the “Due Process
Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty or
property only by the exercise of lawful power.”151 He then cited Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Environment152 as support for his contention that
“[t]his is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve
disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a
sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.”153
Although both cases deal with issues of sovereign power, neither
Giaccio nor Citizens for a Better Environment is a personal jurisdiction
case. Giaccio involved a Pennsylvania statute authorizing a jury to impose
the cost of criminal prosecution on a defendant acquitted of a misdemeanor
charge.154 The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Due
Process Clause because of its vagueness and the absence of any standards
sufficient to enable the defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary
and discriminatory imposition of costs.155
Citizens for a Better
Environment involved subject matter jurisdiction, not personal
jurisdiction.156 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
and thus the Court never mentioned or considered the Due Process
Clause.157 Justice Kennedy also cites Burnham v. Superior Court158 for the
proposition that “neither statute nor judicial decree may bind strangers to
the State.”159 Burnham, however, is a case in which jurisdiction was valid
because the defendant was effectively served with process while physically
present in the forum state.160
These cases tell us nothing about the application of the personal
150

382 U.S. 399 (1966).
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (emphasis added).
152
523 U.S. 83 (1988).
153
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (emphases added).
154
Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402.
155
Id.
156
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., concurring).
157
Id.
158
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
159
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787; see also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608–09 (stating that the
“proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void” could traditionally be “embodied
in the phrase coram non judice, ‘before a person not a judge’—meaning, in effect, that the proceeding
in question was not a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could
therefore not yield a judgment”).
160
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610.
151
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jurisdiction right pursuant to the Due Process Clause, but they do tell us
something about Justice Kennedy’s views on the foundation of the
personal jurisdiction right. In describing the foundation of a challenge to
personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy neither cited nor discussed the
Supreme Court’s 1985 statement in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz161 that
“[a]lthough this protection [of an individual’s liberty interest] operates to
restrict state power, ‘it must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,’ rather
than as a function ‘of federalism concerns.’”162
Justice Kennedy later reiterated that Due Process is an “individual”
right and paid lip service to the Court’s prior statement in Insurance Co. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites that “[t]he personal jurisdiction
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but
as a matter of individual liberty.”163 But, as characterized by Professor
Patrick Borchers, Justice Kennedy nevertheless proceeded with “a bullheaded attempt to ground personal jurisdiction in a sovereignty theory” 164
rather than in an individual liberty theory. Exemplifying this viewpoint,
Justice Kennedy opined:
Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts “judicial power not
as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty,” for due process protects the individual’s right to be
subject only to lawful power. But whether a judicial
judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has
authority to render it.165
For Justice Kennedy, it is not “individual liberty,” but instead “sovereign
authority” that is the “central concept” of Due Process in the context of
personal jurisdiction.166 Furthermore, “jurisdiction is in the first instance a
question of authority rather than fairness.”167
Justice Kennedy provided some insight into his definition of
purposeful availment by assessing the O’Connor and Brennan plurality
opinions in Asahi. Justice Kennedy characterized Justice Brennan’s Asahi
161

471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Id. at 472 n.13 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S
694, 702–03 n.10 (1982)).
163
Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702. Compagnie Des Bauxites was a decision in which
all nine Justices agreed on the result, eight Justices signed on to the Majority opinion, and one Justice
concurred separately.
164
Borchers, supra note 8, at 1263.
165
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
166
Id. at 2788–89; cf. Perdue, supra note 127, at 458 (“The view that personal jurisdiction
involves an allocation of sovereign authority is also consistent with how personal jurisdiction is
approached internationally.”).
167
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
162
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concurrence as “advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and
foreseeability.”168 This is a plain mischaracterization of Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in Asahi.169 Justice Brennan and seven other Justices
acknowledged and agreed that it would be unfair to subject Asahi to
jurisdiction in California. Justice Brennan wrote separately to argue that
Asahi, by its actions, purposefully availed itself of the California market
and had engaged in sufficient minimum contacts.170 He did not need to
write separately about fairness. Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected Justice
Brennan’s Asahi concurrence because—as he mischaracterizes—it “is
inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power. This Court’s
precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s actions, not his
expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”171
By contrast, Justice Kennedy agreed with the purposeful availment
approach in Justice O’Connor’s Asahi plurality opinion, which focuses on
whether a defendant’s activities demonstrate “an intent or purpose to serve
the market in the forum State.”172 There, Justice O’Connor explains that
“[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the
forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have
predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”173
But Justice Kennedy was not satisfied with simply approving Justice
O’Connor’s Asahi statement of purposeful availment because it did not go
far enough for him.174 He wanted the Court to adopt a more rigorous
approach to purposeful availment that would require a plaintiff to
demonstrate that “the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit
to the power of a sovereign.”175 For Justice Kennedy, the determination of
Id.; see also id. at 2788 (“[T]he opinion made foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.”).
In earlier opinions, Justice Brenan had advocated an approach under which all of the
International Shoe factors, including the defendant’s contacts with the forum, were assessed “under a
general rubric of fairness.” FREER, supra note 29, § 2.4.4 at 79–80 (describing the “Fairness Factors”
extrapolated from the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence).
170
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 116, 121 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (explaining the reasoning for why Asahi had established sufficient minimum contacts in
California).
171
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789; see also id. at 2790 (noting the “undesirable consequences of
Justice Brennan’s approach”).
172
See id. at 2790 (“[T]he authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on purposeful
availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi.”); id. (“Respondent has not established
that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.”).
173
Id. at 2788.
174
See id. at 2790 (“The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends
on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi, does not by itself
resolve many difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases.”).
175
Id. at 2788; see also id. at 2791 (“Due process protects petitioner’s right to be subject only to
lawful authority. At no time did petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent
to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws. New Jersey is without power to adjudge the rights
168
169
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“whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the
power of a sovereign” is the “principal inquiry” in a specific jurisdiction
case.176 Due Process protects the defendant from improper exercise of
state power, unless the defendant has submitted to that power. Justice
Kennedy concluded that New Jersey lacked jurisdiction because J.
McIntyre did not “engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal[ed] an
intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws.”177
2. Application of Justice Kennedy’s New Purposeful Availment
Standard
Justice Kennedy did not offer any specifics on what evidence would
satisfy his requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate that a defendant’s
activities manifested an intention to submit to the power of the forum state.
We do know, however, that the issue will only arise when the defendant
has not expressly consented to submit to the power of a sovereign either
during the course of the litigation or prior to litigation by ex ante
agreement and the defendant also has not waived or forfeited the objection
to jurisdiction during litigation. In such case, the plaintiff must therefore
use evidence of the defendant’s activities in or affecting the forum state in
order to establish the defendant’s implied, but intentional, submission to
the forum state’s authority.
This sounds a lot like the International Shoe test, which focuses on a
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.178 But Justice Kennedy added a
new, heightened requirement of purposeful availment to prove before one
can consider the “fairness” of the exercise of personal jurisdiction.179
Purposeful availment exists where the defendant, by its actions within or
directed toward the forum state, “invok[es] the benefits and protections of
[the forum States’] laws.”180 Where it is proper to “infer an intention to
benefit from” the laws of the forum state, it is proper to infer “an intention
to submit to the laws of the forum State.”181 Likewise, where the
and liabilities of J. McIntyre, and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.”); id. at 2787
(setting forth examples of presence, citizenship, domicile, incorporation location of principal place of
business “from which it is proper to infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to
the laws of the forum State”).
176
Id. at 2788; see also id. (asserting that “submission” to sovereign authority occurs “through
contact with and activity directed at a sovereign”).
177
Id. at 2791.
178
See id. at 2787 (“A court may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has
sufficient contacts with the sovereign such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945))).
179
See id. (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot
transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law.”).
180
Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
181
Id.
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defendant’s activities “reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the
protection of” the forum state’s laws, it is proper to infer an intent to
submit to the forum state’s sovereign authority.182
Thus, Justice Kennedy would raise the bar for purposeful availment.
Purposeful availment does not simply “ensure[] that a defendant will not
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous or
attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third
person.”183 Instead, a defendant’s activities must manifest an intent to
submit to sovereign authority.184 And although Justice Kennedy focused
on a defendant’s intentions, he would not permit courts to consider a
defendant’s expectations when determining the defendant’s intention.185
If Justice Kennedy’s analysis were adopted, it would essentially grant
complete immunity to component part manufacturers. It also would grant
immunity to end product manufacturers who hire a middle man distributor
to complete actual sales to individual states. By building in this layer of
protection through its actions, end product manufacturers would be
evidencing their intention not to submit to a state’s sovereign power
despite their certain intent to make sales in the forum state.
Justice Kennedy would raise the bar for purposeful availment, thereby
minimizing the number of cases in which the state courts will have
personal jurisdiction. But he also sought to eliminate the balancing test for
fairness by making it redundant: “In products-liability cases like this one, it
is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”186 For Justice
Kennedy, if there is purposeful availment because a defendant has
manifested an intention to submit to the forum state’s sovereign authority,
it cannot offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for
the forum state’s court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Just to
be clear, Justice Kennedy would greatly restrict the number of cases for
which there is purposeful availment by requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant intended to submit to the power of the forum state. Because
Justice Kennedy would raise the bar so high for establishing personal
jurisdiction, he can safely eliminate as redundant the fairness inquiry of
whether jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
Finally, in a fitting bit of irony, Justice Kennedy opined that the Court
182

Id. at 2791.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
185
Id. at 2789 (“[I]t is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts
to subject him to judgment.”).
186
Id. at 2787 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183
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should fashion clear jurisdictional rules “whenever possible” in order to
avoid the “significant expenses [that] are incurred just on the preliminary
issue of jurisdiction.”187 Even so, he asserted that the development and
clarification of the principle of purposeful availment will occur on a caseby-case basis “in common-law fashion.”188
3. Back to the Future for Justice Kennedy?
As Justice Ginsburg alluded to in her dissent, several of the concepts
put forth by Justice Kennedy have already been considered and rejected by
the Supreme Court in its earlier personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.189 In
attempting to identify the origins and constitutional foundation of personal
jurisdiction, the Court and commentators alike have debated whether the
primary concern of personal jurisdiction is the protection of state
sovereignty and federalism or, alternatively, the protection of individual
liberty.190
But the Supreme Court has previously concluded that the restrictions
on the ability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents is
“ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause” because “[t]hat Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns.”191
Likewise, Justice Kennedy posits that the crucial inquiry in a specific
jurisdiction case is “whether the defendant’s activities manifest an
187

Id. at 2790.
Id.; see also id. at 2789 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-bysovereign, analysis.”).
189
Id. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality’s notion that consent is the
animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court.”); see also Borchers,
supra note 8, at 1246 (stating that Justice Kennedy’s “plurality opinion attempted to roll back the clock
by a century or more and re-ground personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty theory that the Court
had apparently rejected several times before”).
190
See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 6–7 (2010) (examining how
“[l]iberty is a relational concept, and one cannot fully understand the relationship between a state and
citizens of other states without understanding the web of relationships between individuals, states, and
the national government”); Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 853–54 (1989) (discussing how the “Supreme Court began to develop the
principles of federal law that would restrict state judicial power over noncitizens”).
191
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10
(1982); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (1985) (“The Due Process Clause
protects an individual’s liberty interest.”); id. at 472 n.13 (“Although this protection [of an individual’s
liberty interest] operates to restrict state power, it ‘must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,’ rather than as a function ‘of federalism
concerns.’” (quoting Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 702–03 n.10)); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States . . .
[is not] . . . the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”). But see Perdue, supra note
127, at 458 (“The role of jurisdiction as a doctrine for allocating power among sovereigns has been
obscured by the Court’s focus on the Due Process Clause . . . .”).
188
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intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”
Justice Kennedy
acknowledges that specific jurisdiction cases arise “despite [a defendant]
not having consented to the exercise of jurisdiction.”193 Thus, this inquiry
sounds remarkably similar to “the long-discredited fiction of implied
consent.”194 Justice Ginsburg points out that the Supreme Court long ago
rejected the concept of implied consent as the basis for personal
jurisdiction.195
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s focus on submission to sovereign authority
raises the specter that the Court would be forced to revisit its jurisprudence
regarding choice of law issues.196 Justice Kennedy in fact ties the two
concepts together when he writes that the Due Process Clause protects
individuals against the unlawful exercise of power both “with respect to
the power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process [and]
with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for
those within its sphere.”197 A sovereign’s legislative authority to regulate
the conduct of a nonresident is surely as important to the defendant as its
authority to exercise jurisdiction over that nonresident defendant.198 And
the Court’s decisions currently provide that a state may apply its law even
192

192
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion); see also id. (stating that “submission” to
sovereign authority occurs “through contact with and activity directed at a sovereign”).
193
Id. at 2785.
194
Id. at 2799 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Borchers, supra note 8, at 1264 (“Rather
than attempting to recast minimum contacts as a proxy for state sovereignty, it would have been more
intellectually honest if the plurality had said that it hoped to overrule International Shoe and return U.S.
jurisdiction to Pennoyer-era notions of sovereignty and consent.”). But see Transgrud, supra note 190,
at 890 (arguing that the personal jurisdiction inquiry should focus on political “consent”).
195
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196
See Borchers, supra note 8, at 1269 (“To some extent, choice of law sits in the corner of the
Supreme Court’s minimum contacts cases like the uninvited and brooding party guest.”); Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1130 (1966) (“Current American thinking respecting both adjudicatory jurisdiction and
recognition of foreign judgments has placed little emphasis on choice-of-law considerations; either the
problem is ignored or it is assumed that the concerns of the various interested communities in the
underlying situation are adequately recognized and adjusted through choice of law.”).
197
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
198
See Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
960, 960–62 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague regarding
the choice of law); James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872,
873–75 (1980) (calling for a reevaluation of personal jurisdiction over defendants through unrelated
minimum contacts within the venue state); Courtland H. Peterson, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Revisited, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 37–40 (1988) (evaluating the effects of the Allstate decision on
personal jurisdiction); Robert Allen Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The
Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031, 1032–34 (1978) (discussing the
appropriate exercise of a state's personal jurisdiction on a defendant); Louise Weinberg, The Place of
Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 100–02
(1988) (considering the constitutional questions of personal jurisdiction in relation to state law and
foreign defendants).
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though it lacks personal jurisdiction, and vice versa.

B. Justice Ginsburg’s View of Purposeful Availment
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reaffirms the International Shoe test and the
Court’s prior specific jurisdiction doctrine.200 She urges that application of
International Shoe and its progeny should “unequivocally” lead to a
finding of jurisdiction.201 Yet, she acknowledges that the Court has never
considered a fact pattern like that in Nicastro—a foreign defendant end
product manufacturer who retains a U.S. distributor to market and sell the
manufacturer’s product throughout the fifty States.202 Thus, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent is premised upon a new concept—a defendant that
seeks to develop a market for its products everywhere in the United States
has purposefully availed itself of each of the individual states in which the
manufacturer’s product is sold.
Justice Ginsburg highlighted facts that were disclosed during discovery
that confirmed that the defendant J. McIntyre had hired McIntyre America
as its exclusive U.S. distributor with the express purpose of selling as many
of the defendant’s products as possible “anywhere in” and “throughout”
the United States.203 The Justice asked rhetorically:
On what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory
authority could the place of Nicastro’s injury within the
United States be deemed off limits for his products liability
claim against a foreign manufacturer who targeted the United
States (including all the States that constitute the Nation) as
the territory it sought to develop?204
199

Compare Phillipps Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805–06 (1985) (holding that the
defendant utility company had standing to assert that Kansas lacked personal jurisdiction in a class
action suit against it), with Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977) (holding that a shareholder
cannot bring suit against a company's non-domiciled directors in the state of the company's domicile).
200
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2804 (“While I
dissent from the Court’s judgment, I take heart that the plurality opinion does not speak for the Court,
for that opinion would take a giant step away from the notions of ‘fair play and substantial justice’
underlying International Shoe.” (citations omitted)); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850–51, 2853–54 (2011) (reaffirming, in an unanimous opinion written by
Justice Ginsburg, that the International Shoe test is appropriate for specific jurisdiction cases).
201
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see id. at 2802 (acknowledging
that “this Court has not considered in any prior case the now-prevalent pattern presented here—a
foreign-country manufacturer enlisting a U.S. distributor to develop a market in the United States for
the manufacturer’s products”).
202
Id. at 2802.
203
Id. at 2796–97.
204
Id. at 2797. Justice Ginsburg found this scenario so troubling that she mentioned it twice. The
first time she asked:
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United States for machines it
manufactures. It hopes to derive substantial revenue from sales it makes to United
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Justice Ginsburg concluded that the defendant had “purposefully
availed itself” of the entire U.S. market and that, in similar circumstances,
numerous other state and federal courts had found jurisdiction to be
appropriate205:
In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to
promote and sell its machines in the United States,
“purposefully availed itself” of the United States market
nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete
collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of
the market of all States in which its products were sold by its
exclusive distributor.206
Justice Ginsburg pointedly attacked Justice Kennedy’s view of
personal jurisdiction theory and precedent.
She criticized Justice
Kennedy’s conclusion that the defendant’s efforts to develop the U.S. as a
nationwide market is not even relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.207 She
also asserted that among “[a] few points on which there should be no
genuine debate”208 is the recognition that “the constitutional limits on a
state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due
process, not state sovereignty.”209 Finally, Justice Ginsburg denounced
Justice Kennedy’s “notion that consent is the animating concept” of
personal jurisdiction as one entirely contrary to the Court’s prior
precedent.210 Justice Ginsburg also stated that “a forum can exercise
jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient;
invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is
unnecessary and unhelpful.”211

States purchasers. Where in the United States buyers reside does not matter to this
manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can. It
excludes no region or State from the market it wishes to reach. But, all things
considered, it prefers to avoid products liability litigation in the United States. To
that end, it engages a U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside. Has it
succeeded in escaping personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is
sold and causes injury or even death to a local user?
Id. at 2794.
205
Id. at 2801, app. at 2804–06.
206
Id. at 2801.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 2797.
209
Id. at 2798 (noting the contrast to Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion which “assert[ed] that
‘sovereign authority,’ not ‘fairness’ is the ‘central concept’ in determining personal jurisdiction”).
210
Id. at 2798–99.
211
Id. at 2799.
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C. Justice Breyer’s View of Purposeful Availment
1. All Three Asahi Approaches Appear Acceptable—and the Plaintiff
Failed to Satisfy Any One of Them
As previously discussed, Justice Breyer accepts the International Shoe
test and his concurrence stays within the bounds of the Court’s prior
personal jurisdiction decisions.212 He is unwilling to “abandon the
heretofore accepted inquiry of whether, focusing upon the relationship
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, it is fair, in light of
defendant’s contacts with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit
there.”213 For Justice Breyer, the Constitution demands both minimum
contacts and purposeful availment, “each of which rests upon a particular
notion of defendant-focused fairness.”214
Justice Breyer explicitly rejects the reasoning of Justice Kennedy’s
Nicastro plurality opinion: “The plurality seems to state strict rules that
limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not ‘inten[d] to submit to the
power of a sovereign’ and cannot ‘be said to have targeted the forum.’ . . . I
do not agree with the plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule.”215
Justice Breyer did not specifically address Justice Kennedy’s elevation
of consent to sovereign authority as the “central concept” of Due Process
in the context of personal jurisdiction. But he nevertheless appears to
reject that understanding. He states that he agrees with Justice Kennedy on
the outcome of the case, but he “concur[s] only in the judgment of that
opinion and not its reasoning.”216 He implicitly rejects Justice Kennedy’s
consent to sovereign authority approach by arguing that the personal
jurisdiction inquiry focuses on fairness to the defendant.217
Justice Breyer also explicitly rejects the approach to purposeful
availment taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court and urged by the
plaintiff in Nicastro,218 stating: “Under that view, a producer is subject to
jurisdiction for a products liability action so long as it ‘knows or
reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold
See discussion supra Part V.B (discussing Justice Breyer’s opinion in Nicastro).
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
214
Id.
215
Id. (citations omitted).
216
Id. at 2794.
217
See id. at 2793 (“[C]onstitutional demand for ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘purposefu[l]
avail[ment]’ each . . . rest upon a particular notion of defendant-focused fairness.”); id. (refusing to
“abandon the heretofore accepted inquiry of whether . . . it is fair, in light of the defendant’s contacts
with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit there”); id. at 2793–94 (demonstrating a concern for
“basic fairness” and whether it would be “fundamentally unfair” to subject defendant to jurisdiction).
218
Id. at 2793.
212
213
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in any of the fifty states.’” Awareness or foreseeability is not enough.
Although he concurs in the result with Justice Kennedy, nowhere does
Justice Breyer reject the reasoning of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Justice
Breyer does agree with Justice Ginsburg that personal jurisdiction is
premised upon considerations of fairness to the defendant.221 He also
indicates a willingness to consider in a future case the contemporary
commercial circumstances that were considered in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent.222 But he refused to consider them in Nicastro because the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction and the plaintiff in
Nicastro failed to meet this burden.223
Justice Breyer seemed inclined to accept each of the three Asahi
approaches as a valid way for a plaintiff to establish purposeful availment
by an end product manufacturer such as the defendant McIntyre: (1)
Justice O’Connor’s approach, that is, proof of purposeful targeting of New
Jersey customers or “special state-related design, advertising, advice,
marketing, or anything else”; (2) Justice Brennan’s approach, that is, proof
of a “regular and anticipated flow of products” to New Jersey for retail sale
as part of an established distribution system; and (3) Justice Stevens’s
approach, that is, proof of a “regular course of dealing” that involves a
certain level of volume, value, or particularly hazardous goods.224
2. Modern Concerns May Shape Justice Breyer’s Take on Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine
Although Justice Breyer reasoned that the outcome of Nicastro was
determined by the Court’s existing precedent, he expressed an interest in
quickly revisiting personal jurisdiction doctrine in a case with a fully
219
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 592
(2010)). Although he explicitly rejects this reasoning, Justice Breyer limits his rejection to “the context
of this case.” Id. Elsewhere, however, he notes that the Court has “strongly suggested” that
foreseeability or awareness or even the hope that a product will end up in the forum State is not enough
to constitute purposeful availment. Id. at 2792.
220
See id. at 2792 (“And the Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested that a single sale
of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and
hoping) that such a sale will take place.”).
221
See id. at 2793 (questioning whether “it is fair . . . to subject the defendant to suit there”); id.
(“[T]he constitutional demand for ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘purposefu[l] avail[ment],’ each . . . rest
upon a particular notion of defendant-focused fairness.”); id. at 2793–94 (demonstrating concern for
“basic fairness of an absolute rule”); id. at 2794 (acknowledging that there is a question of
“fundamental[] unfair[ness]”).
222
Id. at 2791.
223
Id. at 2792.
224
Id. Justice Breyer approves the Brennan approach to the extent that it includes a
“regular . . . flow” or “regular course” of product sales in the forum State. He does not approve the
Brennan approach to the extent that it finds purposeful availment whenever the manufacturer is aware
or can foresee that is product may end up in the forum State. Id.
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developed factual record regarding “contemporary commercial
circumstances.”225 On that score, Justice Breyer stated: “Because the
incident at issue in this case does not implicate modern concerns, and
because the factual record leaves many open questions, this is an
unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic
jurisdictional rules.”226
In particular, Justice Breyer expressed concerns over manufacturers
who advertise, market, or sell products over the Internet or through an
Internet-based retailer like Amazon.com.227 He also expressed concern
about the effect of exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign
manufacturers—especially those who distribute their products primarily
through an Internet retailer such as Amazon.com—on foreign policy.228
Justice Breyer is not the only Justice struggling to define the scope of
the purposeful availment requirement and to assess its national and
international impact. At oral argument in Nicastro, Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Roberts grappled with the relevant difference in treatment, if
any, that should be afforded to a foreign manufacturer who simply makes a
component part for a product that ends up in the United States as compared
to that treatment afforded to an end product manufacturer.229 Justices
Breyer, Scalia, Kagan, and Ginsburg also expressed concern over whether
the United States is in line with other countries regarding the requirements
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments against U.S.
companies, as compared to the purposeful availment requirement for a
foreign manufacturer who is sued in the United States.230
On the one hand, an expansive view of personal jurisdiction might lead
foreign companies to refuse to do business in the United States. On the
other hand, a restrictive view of personal jurisdiction might lead U.S.
225

Id. at 2794.
Id. at 2792–93.
227
Id. at 2793.
228
Justice Breyer questioned Benjamin J. Horwich, Assistant to the Solicitor General, in oral
arguments: “[Y]ou’ve heard the [oral] arguments in [Nicastro]. I mean, it seemed that potentially can
subject the smallest manufacturer to liability throughout the world because it uses the Internet. . . . I
don’t know what the foreign policy—you’ve heard treaties discussed, et cetera. Do you want to say
anything?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 21:12–18, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 1846 (2011) (No. 10-76); see also id. at 21:22–22:1 (“The . . . brief answer is that
the Internet questions, in particular, are so complicated and, indeed, so potentially far-reaching that in a
case that presented them, our interest might very well be different.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at
31:11–17, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (“[M]y problem
is a sort of policy problem . . . I don’t see how the world’s going to work or develop if in fact every
small business everywhere in the world has to know . . . the law of every 50 States and hire lawyers and
come here, rather than making the accident victim go there.”).
229
Transcript of Oral Argument at 46:24–51:21, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343).
230
Id. at 33:12–36:20; see also Perdue, supra note 127, at 461–65 (observing that most countries
do not require proof of purposeful availment).
226
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companies to outsource business to foreign subsidiaries who—even in a
case where the outsourced product is manufactured for a U.S. consumer
who is subsequently injured by the product—will then be immune to
litigation and judgment in U.S. state courts.
VII. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT AND A DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO “SEVER
ITS CONNECTION WITH” THE FORUM STATE
Although Nicastro produced no majority opinion, the views expressed
in the plurality opinions will guide state and federal trial courts in assessing
objections to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. Identifying the holding of Nicastro requires lower courts to
determine the “position taken by those [Justices] who concurred in the
judgment[] on the narrowest grounds.”231 Based on Justice Breyer’s
concurrence, Nicastro reaffirms existing precedent and, for the most part,
personal jurisdiction doctrine:


A majority of the Court rejects Justice Kennedy’s understanding of
purposeful availment—that a defendant’s activities must manifest
an intention to submit to sovereign authority.232



International Shoe provides the relevant test for specific
jurisdiction and it requires minimum contacts for which there is
purposeful availment.233



If a plaintiff can establish minimum contacts and purposeful
availment, the court must determine whether it would nonetheless
be unfair to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum
state’s courts.234



A majority of the Court continues to reject the pure “Stream of
Commerce” approach—there is no jurisdiction over a defendant
manufacturer who sells its product to a consumer in State A who
then takes the product to State B where the product causes injury
to the consumer, even if the manufacturer is “aware” or “foresees”

231
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see also id. (“When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976))); see generally Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980).
232
See discussion supra Part VI.A (discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion regarding purposeful
availment in relation to the majority opinion).
233
See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the applicability of the International Shoe test).
234
E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at
2800–01, 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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235

that the product may enter State B.

Although the three opinions in Nicastro reveal agreement on several
principles—including the shared view that purposeful availment is a
requirement—they did not resolve the confusion regarding what constitutes
purposeful availment.
This Article identifies one simple organizing principle that must guide
the Court in its quest to define and apply the purposeful availment
requirement: no court should subject a nonresident defendant to personal
jurisdiction for a contact with the forum state that the defendant cannot
reasonably prevent. Put another way, where it is not reasonably feasible
for a defendant to sever its connection with the forum state, purposeful
availment (and therefore specific jurisdiction) does not exist. Conversely,
where it is reasonably feasible for a defendant to sever its connection to a
state but it has not done so, there is presumptively purposeful availment of
that state and, subject to the fairness balancing, specific jurisdiction over
the defendant.
Justice White discussed this concept when writing for a six-person
majority in World-Wide Volkswagen:
When a corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state . . . it has clear
notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate
the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance,
passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are
too great, severing its connection with the State.236
Justice Ginsburg noted in her opinion that J. McIntyre had, in fact,
purchased such product liability insurance.237 She cited scholarship
indicating that such insurance is both readily available and relatively
cheap.238 Likewise, a manufacturer can easily pass the costs on to its
consumers by raising prices. Justice Breyer rightly pointed out, however,
235

See, e.g., id. at 2788 (plurality opinion); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citations omitted); see
also Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“It may be that a larger firm can readily
alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to
customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State. . . . But manufacturers
come in many shapes and sizes. It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small [business] . . . to
respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 119 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 297) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
237
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
238
Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Drobak, supra note 8 (“People in business
should buy liability insurance; that is just part of doing business. Their insurance companies can
defend suits more easily than injured victims can sue at the home of the defendant.”).
236
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that the existence of insurance and the ability to raise prices may not be
feasible for small-scale manufacturers who do not reasonably produce
enough products to spread the costs of protecting against their risk:
It may be that a larger firm can readily “alleviate the risk of
burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State.” But manufacturers
come in many shapes and sizes. It may be fundamentally
unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian
manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer,
selling its products through international distributors, to
respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State
in the United States, even those in respect to which the
foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single
(allegedly defective) good. And a rule like the New Jersey
Supreme Court suggests would require every product
manufacturer, large or small, selling to American distributors
to understand not only the tort law of every State, but also the
wide variance in the way courts within different States apply
that law.239
Thus, the availability of insurance and the ability to spread risk
through targeted price increases may be impractical for certain defendants
and therefore it would be inappropriate to subject these defendants to
personal jurisdiction in a distant forum. Justice Breyer appears to ignore
the answer to his own hypothetical—that the “unfairness” of exercising
jurisdiction is limited by the inquiry into whether such exercise would
“offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”240
But one course of conduct must be available to potential defendants of
all sizes and types in order to subject them to jurisdiction in a foreign
forum. A nonresident economic actor must be able to pattern its conduct
so as to sever its connection with that state. A potential defendant must be
able to structure its actions to avoid purposeful availment of a particular
state if it wishes to avoid jurisdiction in that state. This analysis is
consistent with the notion that personal jurisdiction is an individual interest
that is protected by the Due Process Clause.241 Existing precedent
confirms that this interest may be waived or consented to both before
litigation arises and after, and also may be forfeited by a careless defendant
239

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
241
See discussion supra Part I (discussing the interaction between personal jurisdiction and the
Due Process Clause).
240

80

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:41

242

who fails to diligently assert this right.
If the interest is truly an
individual liberty interest then it must be applied so that nonresidents can
reasonably structure their conduct so as to avoid purposeful availment and
ultimately the power of the forum state’s courts. As the Supreme Court
stated in World-Wide Volkswagen, the purposeful availment requirement
embodied in the Due Process Clause lends “a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit.”243
This principle explains the Court’s prior decisions:


In World-Wide Volkswagen, the New York dealership sold cars in
New York.244 Once the car was sold in New York, the customer
was free to take it to Oklahoma. It was not possible for defendant
to prevent customers from taking their cars to other states absent
getting out of the business of car sales. Because it was not
reasonably feasible for the dealership to prevent the car from going
to Oklahoma there was no purposeful availment. This same
reasoning applies to any product—even a product that is not
“mobile by nature”245—placed in the stream of commerce. Thus,
the Court rejects the pure stream of commerce theory of personal
jurisdiction.246



In Hanson v. Denckla,247 the Delaware corporate defendant
established a trust in 1935 for Mrs. Donner, a Pennsylvania
resident, and then acted as trustee.248 It was not reasonably
feasible for the defendant to prevent Mrs. Donner from moving to
Florida. Therefore, the defendant did not purposefully avail itself

242
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) (“In
sum, the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a
defendant may be estopped from raising the issue. These characteristics portray it for what it is—a
legal right protecting the individual.”); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16
(1964) (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to
permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”); Scott Dodson,
Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1457–58 (2011) (“In its modern conception,
personal jurisdiction ‘represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty but as a
matter of individual liberty.’ Because of this basis, the requirement of personal jurisdiction can, like
other personal rights, be waived, consented to, or forfeited. It is even subject to estoppel principles
imposed under the aegis of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's sanctions provisions.” (citations
omitted)).
243
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
244
Id. at 289.
245
In re Holiday Airline Corp., 620 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1980).
246
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99.
247
357 U.S. 235 (1958)
248
Id. at 238.
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249

of Florida.


In McGee, the Court found purposeful availment and personal
jurisdiction based on a single contact with the forum state.250 The
defendant mailed a reinsurance certificate to an individual in
California and entered into a policy of insurance with the
California resident.251 The defendant could have severed—simply
and effectively—its connection with California by refusing to mail
any policies to California residents and by refusing to insure
California residents.



In Asahi, the defendant Asahi manufactured tire valve assemblies
in Japan and shipped them to Taiwan, where they were sold to
Cheng Shin.252 Cheng Shin purchased tire valve assemblies from
several other manufacturers as well as from Asahi.253 Cheng Shin
incorporated the various tire valve assemblies in its finished tire
tubes, which Cheng Shin sold throughout the world.254 One of
Asahi’s tire valve assemblies was incorporated in a Cheng Shin
tire tube, which was incorporated in a Honda Motorcycle, which
was ultimately sold in California. It was not reasonably feasible
for Asahi to prevent the sale of the motorcycle in California and
thereby to sever its connection with California. The defendant
“was a component-part manufacturer with ‘little control over the
final destination of its products once they were delivered into the
stream of commerce.’”255 It was an “easy” case for the Court to
quickly decide that California did not have specific jurisdiction
over Asahi.256 The individual Justices struggled, however, to
determine whether there was purposeful availment. When one
considers that it was not reasonably feasible for Asahi to prevent
its products from reaching California, it again becomes an easy
case. Absent additional conduct by Asahi directed toward

249
Id. at 252. Today, a defendant might include a forum selection clause in the trust document in
order to avoid having to litigate in Florida or any other disfavored forum. When the Hanson trust was
drafted in 1935, however, forum selection clauses were disfavored and presumptively unenforceable.
Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 595–99 (2007) (discussing the rise of contracts
that modify litigation rules and courts’ initial resistance to enforcing them).
250
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding that the suit was based on
a contract which had substantial connection with the forum state of California).
251
Id. at 221–22.
252
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Uberti v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1361 (Ariz. 1995)).
256
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (plurality opinion).
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California, there can be no purposeful availment.

The one case that does not fit the pattern as easily is Nicastro. In
Nicastro, the defendant was an end product manufacturer who sold its
product to a distributor who then resold the product in New Jersey.258 The
product injured a New Jersey resident in New Jersey.259 As an end product
manufacturer, the defendant had significantly more control over the point
of sale of its product than a component parts manufacturer.260 This ability
to control its destiny included the ability to prevent the sale of its product
in New Jersey by restricting the approved sales regions of its sole
authorized distributor, and therefore supported a finding of purposeful
availment.261
As will be shown below, I believe that Nicastro will be short-lived.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, refused to join Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion “without a better understanding of the relevant contemporary
commercial circumstances.”262 Instead he elected to wait for a case that
permits “full consideration of the modern-day consequences” of the “many
recent changes in commerce and communication.”263 When Justices
Breyer and Alito confront such a case, they will likely conclude that an end
product manufacturer who seeks to exploit all fifty States as a market has
purposefully availed itself of each state in which its product is sold and is
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction when the product injures a
consumer in that state. If an end product manufacturer wishes to “sever its
connection with any particular state” in order to avoid being haled into that
state’s courts, it is a simple matter to refrain from marketing its product in
that state and to refuse to permit its product to be sold to consumers in that
state.

257

Id.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
259
Id.
260
See id. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Nicastro from Asahi, in which the
defendant was a component parts manufacturer).
261
Justice Breyer noted that the defendant in Nicastro did not engage in any additional conduct
that would clearly support a finding of purposeful availment: purposeful targeting of New Jersey
customers or “special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing, or anything else”; a
“regular . . . flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey”; or a regular course of dealing that involve a
certain level of volume, value or particularly hazardous goods. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
262
Id. at 2794.
263
Id. at 2791.
258
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VIII. PROPER APPLICATION OF THE PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
REQUIREMENT
A. Location of the Initial Sale, Service, or Conduct
An economic actor controls the location of the initial sale of product,
provision of a service, or other commercial conduct that might give rise to
liability. By initial sale, I mean the location of the initial transaction
whereby the product is available to the public for purchase and passes to
the hands of a consumer. The consumer may be an individual or it may be
a business—even a business that intends to resell the product. The initial
sale need not be the point at which the product leaves the hands of the
manufacturer. When a manufacturer hires a distributor who then
distributes the product to a retailer, who in turn makes the product
available to the public, the initial sale occurs at the location where the
retailer sold the item to an individual consumer.
It is a relatively simple matter for an Indiana manufacturer to avoid an
initial sale in California: make all initial sales in Indiana, or refuse to make
initial sales in California.264 If the Indiana manufacturer wishes to focus on
manufacturing (rather than direct sales), it might hire a distributor. The
Indiana manufacturer can easily avoid California by requiring that its
distributor(s) agree(s), as part of the distribution agreement, not to
distribute the product to consumers or retailers in California. Unlike
litigation brought where the plaintiff resides, litigation brought in the state
of original purchase allows the manufacturer to tailor prices so that
purchasers in each state bear the costs of that court’s biases, thus removing
the incentive for courts to be biased.265
Likewise, an economic actor who resides in Indiana can limit the
provision of services to Indiana or it can refuse to provide services in
California and other states unfavorable to foreign defendants. Finally, an
individual or organization that resides in Indiana can limit its activities to
the State of Indiana or it can refuse to travel to and conduct activity in
California. Thus, where an economic actor makes an initial sale in
California, or provides services in California, or engages in commercial
activity in California, there is presumptively purposeful availment of
California for a lawsuit that arises from that conduct.266
264
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“If
[the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have
been simple—it could have chosen not to sell its services to Pennsylvania residents.”).
265
Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Products Liability, 4 (USC Ctr. in Law, Econ. &
Org., Research Paper No. C12-2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1987223.
266
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Nicastro included an Appendix of lower court
decisions that are consistent with the notion that “jurisdiction is appropriately exercised by courts of the
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B. Subsequent Movement to the Forum State
Once the initial sale is made and the product leaves the manufacturer’s
hands, is it possible for the manufacturer to prevent its movement to a
particular state? In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court confirmed that the
manufacturer is not responsible for the unilateral actions of a consumer in
taking the product to another state—even though the product was
inherently mobile.267 The Court implicitly recognized that the New York
dealership did not purposefully avail itself of Oklahoma because it was not
reasonably feasible to prevent the contact with Oklahoma.268
What steps could the New York dealer have taken to prevent the
product from reaching Oklahoma? It could (1) go out of business
altogether; (2) get out of the business of selling cars; (3) refuse to sell to
Oklahoma residents; or (4) require each purchaser to agree contractually
that it will not take the product to Oklahoma and it will not permit the
product to be taken to Oklahoma by a third party and it will not resell the
product to anyone.
1. Go out of Business Altogether
It is inconsistent with the traditional understanding of purposeful
availment to conclude that the only effective way for a business to avoid
purposeful availment of a particular state is to go out of business.
Purposeful availment requires some intentional action by the defendant
that “create[s] a substantial connection with the forum State.”269
Establishing a business in New York is not an intentional act that creates a
substantial connection with Oklahoma. If an economic actor in New York
possesses a product or service that people outside of New York covet, the
purposeful availment requirement must be applied such that it is at the very
least possible to deliver the product or service in New York while avoiding
purposeful availment of Oklahoma.
2. Get out of the Business of Selling Cars
Even if the New York dealership got out of the business of selling cars,
any product it sold could be taken to Oklahoma through the stream of
commerce.
World-Wide Volkswagen makes clear that purposeful
availment of Oklahoma cannot be based on the simple act of selling a
place where the product was sold and caused injury” where a “local plaintiff [was] injured by the
activity of a manufacturer seeking to exploit a multistate or global market.” Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at
2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Rather than discuss those cases, I refer the reader to the Appendix to
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.
267
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
268
Id. at 297–99.
269
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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270

product, even if the product is inherently mobile.
Again, avoiding
purposeful availment of a distant forum cannot require an individual or
organization simply to avoid commerce altogether.
3. Refuse to Serve or Sell to Oklahoma Residents
In order to avoid contact with Oklahoma, a provider of a service or a
manufacturer of a product could refuse to conduct business with Oklahoma
residents. The first problem with this approach is its ineffectiveness in
preventing the product from eventually reaching Oklahoma. Refusing to
sell products in New York to Oklahoma residents would not effectively
prevent contact with Oklahoma because it would not prevent other (nonOklahoma) purchasers from taking the product to Oklahoma. Nor would it
effectively prevent resale of the product to an Oklahoma resident. It also
would be a simple matter for an Oklahoma resident to arrange for a straw
man purchase by a non-Oklahoma purchaser.
But even if the seller could not guarantee that no Oklahoman
purchased a product, we might conclude that the seller had avoided
purposeful availment of Oklahoma if it reasonably attempted to prevent
sale to an Oklahoma resident but was thwarted by the unilateral furtive
actions of the buyer. Because the seller can reasonably and simply attempt
to avoid sales to Oklahoma residents, should we require it to do so or be
subject to a finding of purposeful availment of Oklahoma based on a single
sale of a product in New York to an Oklahoma resident who later took the
product to Oklahoma where it caused injury?
Consider how this attempt to prevent contact with a particular state
would work in practice. The seller (or provider of a service) could post a
sign on the front of their New York business that states “Oklahomans not
welcome” or “We refuse to serve [or sell to] Oklahoma residents.” The
host at a restaurant would have to inquire of each customer, “You are not a
resident of Oklahoma, are you?”271
If this seems a bit bizarre, compare such a requirement with Internet
retailers who identify the location of their customers to ensure that they do
not sell goods or services that are prohibited or restricted in particular
states.272 As discussed below, however, Internet sales are different because
they involve a purchaser who has not traveled to the state where the
manufacturer makes authorized sales, but instead has remained in the
270

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–99.
A New York dealership could seek to avoid being haled into Oklahoma’s courts for litigation
involving an injury to an Oklahoma purchaser by requiring the execution of a purchase agreement with
a forum selection clause requiring all disputes to be litigated in New York. But such an outcome does
not address or protect against injuries to third parties (non-purchaser passengers, for example) that
occur in Oklahoma.
272
See discussion infra Part VIII.E.
271
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disfavored state. Sales that occur in New York but are made to residents
of Oklahoma do not involve purposeful availment of the State of
Oklahoma; they involve purposeful availment of the State of New York,
which happens to have some transient Oklahoma residents within its
borders.
Ultimately, adoption of a rule that would require a manufacturer that
sells its product in New York to attempt to refuse to sell to Oklahoma
residents would require economic actors to engage in discrimination
against the residents of disfavored states. Such a rule should be rejected
because it conflicts with other constitutional principles, including freedom
against restraints on interstate commerce and the rights of citizens of one
state to travel freely to other states.274
4. Require the Purchaser to Make Contractual Agreements to Limit
Contacts
In order to avoid contact with Oklahoma, the New York dealership
could require each purchaser to execute a purchase agreement whereby the
purchaser agree not to take the product to Oklahoma, not to allow the
product to be taken to Oklahoma by a third party, and not to resell the
product. Does the Due Process Clause require the dealer to make such
efforts or risk a finding of purposeful availment? Again, the car dealership
in World-Wide Volkswagen did not attempt to do so, yet the Court found
that there was no purposeful availment.
Furthermore, such contractual provisions are highly suspect and might
be unenforceable. In general, contractual provisions that eliminate or
restrict the post-sale use or resale of property are void as contrary to public
policy favoring the free movement of property in commerce.275 More than
one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated:
But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it
does not follow in case of sales actually made he may impose
upon purchasers every sort of restriction. Thus, a general
restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid. The right of
alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of
general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation
273

See id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States.”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
275
See John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907) (stating that such
restrictions “offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3–4 (1981) (discussing restraints on alienation);
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 981 (1928) (discussing
that restraint on alienation of property is disfavored and generally void because it restricts the free
movement of property in commerce).
274
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have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy,
which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such
things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in the
alienation of articles, things, chattels, except when a very
special kind of property is involved, such as a slave or an
heirloom, have been generally held void.276
Economic actors have control over the state or states where an initial,
authorized sale takes place or a service is provided. By contrast, economic
actors lack the ability to restrict the movement, use, or resale of their
products or services. Attempts to control the post-sale movement, use, and
resale of products and services are likely to be ineffective and of dubious
legality. Therefore, post-sale activity that results in contact with another
state should not constitute purposeful availment of that state.
C. Component Part Manufacturers
A component part manufacturer does not sell its product directly to
consumers in a particular state, but instead sells the component part to
another manufacturer (end product or component-part) who incorporates
the component part into an end product.277 The end product manufacturer
then controls the system of distribution and the location of the initial sale
for the end product. As discussed above278 and below,279 it is a simple
matter for the end product manufacturer to prevent the initial sale of a
product to consumers/end users in a particular state.
Based on the limited ability of a component part manufacturer to
control the location of the initial sale of the end product, it is not
reasonably feasible for a component part manufacturer to sever its
connection with a particular state.280 Thus, absent some additional conduct
276
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, these contractual provisions would be ineffective absent court action to
enforce them. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948) (refusing to enforce contract between
private parties which contained a racially restrictive covenant); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.3 (3d ed. 1999)
(examining the cases relating to the state commandment or state encouragement of private activities).
This state action to enforce contractual provisions that discriminate against residents of a certain state
might raise Dormant Commerce Clause concerns. See id. § 11.9 (discussing state statutes burdening
the exportation of local products).
277
See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766–67 (Ill. 1961)
(applying the stream of commerce theory to assert jurisdiction over a component part manufacturer that
sold no components directly in Illinois, but did sell them to a manufacturer who incorporated them into
a final product that was sold in Illinois).
278
See discussion supra Part VIII.A.
279
See discussion infra Part VIII.D.
280
A component part manufacturer purposefully avails itself of a particular state—for example,
Oklahoma—where the component part manufacturer sells its component part directly to consumers in
Oklahoma or to distributors or retailers who then make the product available to the public in Oklahoma.

88

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:41

on the part of a New York component part manufacturer, there is no
purposeful availment of Oklahoma when its product is incorporated in an
end product that is later sold in Oklahoma and causes injury there.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi is consistent with this
conclusion. Although Asahi resulted in three separate opinions regarding
purposeful availment and none garnered a majority of the Justices, a
majority of the Court agreed that defendant Asahi did not purposefully
avail itself of California simply by selling its component parts to Cheng
Shin.281 Justices O’Connor’s and Stevens’s opinions both required some
additional facts to support a finding of purposeful availment.282
Furthermore, the additional conduct that gives rise to purposeful
availment by the component part manufacturer must include conduct
indicating an intent or purpose to serve the market as described by Justice
O’Connor in her Asahi plurality opinion. This type of conduct—such as
advertising in the state, providing customer service in the state, or
designing the product for the state—is entirely under the control of the
component part manufacturer. If the component part manufacturer wishes
to sever its connection to the state, it can readily do so by refusing to
engage in such conduct.
By contrast, the additional conduct identified in Justices Stevens’s and
Brennan’s Asahi concurrences—proof of a regular course of dealing that
involves a certain level of volume, value, or particularly hazardous
goods—is not within the control of the component part manufacturer.283
Defendant Asahi did not control whether its tire valve assembly ended up
in a tire on a safe and inexpensive tricycle sold in Australia or on a
dangerous and expensive motorcycle sold in California.284
A component part manufacturer can take action to increase the
likelihood that its product will end up in Oklahoma. If it makes the best
component part in the world, the volume of sales of its product will
increase along with the probability that the product will end up in
A component part manufacturer also will have purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma if it sells its
component part to an end product manufacturer who is located in Oklahoma.
281
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112–13 (1987).
282
Id. at 112 (finding that there was no “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant . . . [indicating] an
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State”); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that defendant Asahi engaged in a “higher quantum of conduct” that included a “regular course of
dealing that result[ed] in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years”).
Justice Brennan noted that there was a “regular flow” of product through established channels of
distribution but he would have found purposeful availment based on a pure stream of commerce theory.
Id. at 117; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 307 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (discussing how state highway programs contribute to the value of automobile
dealerships’ business, and that these contacts are sufficient enough to require such a business to submit
to a state’s jurisdiction).
283
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121–22.
284
Id. at 112–13.
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Oklahoma. Consider the following hypothetical:
Hoosier, Inc. makes a widget. The widget is a component
part in various cellular phones. Hoosier does no advertising
and it has no website. In order to purchase a widget (not yet
installed in a phone), one must go to the “Hoosier Store,”
located in the back of the Hoosier factory in Bloomington,
Indiana. Brad Pitt gets a Hoosier widget installed in his
phone. He falls in love with it. He goes on The Ellen
DeGeneres Show and jumps up and down on a couch
screaming “I love this Hoosier Widget.” Motorobo, an
Illinois corporation that manufactures cell phones and sells
them in ten Midwestern states, sends its purchasing agents to
the Hoosier Store and places an order for $5 million worth of
widgets for each of the next five years. Motorobo arranges to
pick up the widgets in Bloomington. Motorobo incorporates
the Hoosier widget in its latest line of phones. Sales are
strong, especially in Brad Pitt’s birthplace, Oklahoma. For
each of three consecutive years, Motorobo sells phones
containing more than $1 million worth of Hoosier widgets in
Oklahoma.
Has Hoosier, Inc. purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma if there is a
lawsuit claiming a phone purchased in Oklahoma contained a defective
widget? If a regular course of conduct or a quantum of sales can establish
purposeful availment, then the answer must be yes. And it remains so
despite the fact that Hoosier, Inc. cannot reasonably “sever its connection
with Oklahoma.” Sales are high because Hoosier, Inc. makes widgets that
are high quality and popular. If it made lesser quality widgets, they would
be less popular and there would not be a regular course of conduct or
regular sales of its product (albeit by the end product manufacturer) in
Oklahoma. Can it be that an injured Oklahoma resident is able to bring
suit against a manufacturer of a product that is popular because it is well
made and therefore many of the products end up in Oklahoma? But an
injured Oklahoma resident cannot bring suit against a manufacturer of a
product that is less popular because it is poorly made and therefore only a
few such products end up in Oklahoma? Even if the low quality product is
so poorly made that it injures every person that uses it? The purposeful
availment requirement should not engender such anomalous results.
Furthermore, the determination of whether there is a high volume of
sales is arbitrary.285 Therefore, a component part manufacturer lacks

285
As noted by Justice Ginsburg in her Nicastro dissent, there was no purposeful availment in that
case based on the sale of a single $24,900 product. The Court presumably would, however, find
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purposeful availment based solely on a high volume of its product ending
up in a particular state even where the high volume results from a regular
course of sales between the component part manufacturer and an end
product manufacturer who sells the end product in that state.
Consider Intel, for example. Intel is the world’s largest semiconductor
chip maker and describes itself as a component part manufacturer: “We
design and manufacture computing and communications components, such
as microprocessors, chipsets, motherboards, and wireless and wired
connectivity products.”286
Intel’s largest customers are end product computer makers HewlettPackard and Dell.287 If Intel wanted to sever any connection with
Oklahoma—thereby avoiding purposeful availment of Oklahoma—it could
choose to manufacture its semiconductor chips in California and to sell
them exclusively in California.
Likewise, Intel could choose to
manufacture and sell its semiconductor chips in every state but Oklahoma.
Such sales might include other component part manufacturers, end product
manufacturers, and even consumers. But the Intel chips would still make
their way to Oklahoma, just like the automobile in World-Wide
Volkswagen. If Intel did everything possible to avoid Oklahoma, there
should be no purposeful availment.
If Intel chooses to engage in conduct designed to result in the sale of
its semiconductor chips to purchasers (other manufacturers, distributors,
consumers, etc.) in Oklahoma, however, then it has purposefully availed
itself of Oklahoma for lawsuits arising from use of those chips.
Even if it does not make sales to Oklahoma, Intel might choose to
engage in certain conduct directly targeting Oklahoma that constitutes
purposeful availment of Oklahoma. Although Intel primarily makes the
microprocessor that powers other companies’ end products, Intel engages
in a significant amount of sales to end product consumers/users:
We sell our products primarily to original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and original design manufacturers
(ODMs). ODMs provide design and/or manufacturing
services to branded and unbranded private-label resellers. In
addition, we sell our products to other manufacturers,
including makers of a wide range of industrial and
communications equipment. Our customers also include
those who buy PC components and our other products
through distributor, reseller, retail, and OEM channels
purposeful availment based on 24,900 sales of a $1 product. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2803 n.15 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
286
INTEL CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://www.intc.com/intelAR2010/
download/index.html.
287
Id. at 8.
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288

throughout the world.

Intel proudly proclaims that “[t]he Intel brand is consistently ranked as
one of the most recognizable and valuable brands in the world.”289 The
company asserts:
Our corporate marketing objectives are to build a strong,
well-known Intel corporate brand that connects with
businesses and consumers . . . . We promote brand awareness
and generate demand through our own direct marketing as
well as co-marketing programs. Our direct marketing
activities include television, print, and Internet advertising, as
well as press relations, consumer and trade events, and
industry and consumer communications. We market to
consumer and business audiences, and focus on building
awareness and generating demand for increased performance,
improved energy efficiency, and other capabilities such as
Internet connectivity and security.290
If Intel chooses to market and promote its brand to Oklahoma
consumers through its global or nationwide marketing activities, then it has
purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma—even if it makes no sales in
Oklahoma.
To recap, absent proof of additional conduct by a defendant targeting
the forum state, a component part manufacturer has not purposefully
availed itself of the forum state based on injuries caused by the component
product in the forum state even where a high volume of the component
product ends up in the forum state.
This does not leave injured consumers without recourse. Where the
forum state lacks jurisdiction over the component part manufacturer, the
injured consumer will seek relief from the end product manufacturer and
distributor. As described below, these parties control the location of the
initial sale and the price of the product at the initial sale. They are in the
best position to refuse to sell the end product in particular states, to acquire
products liability insurance, and to set appropriate prices given the risks of
litigation in each state.291 The end product manufacturer also can require
the component part manufacturer to defend and indemnify the end product
manufacturer as part of their purchase agreement; they can further demand
that the component part manufacturer make safer and better component
288

Id. at 7.
Id. at Investor Information.
290
Id. at 9.
291
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (discussing why the
manufacturer and distributor should be subject to suit in particular states where they have marketed
their goods (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))).
289
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parts—or stop purchasing them altogether—if the cost of business
becomes too high as a result of defects in the component parts.
D. End Product Manufacturers
Unlike component part manufacturers, end product manufacturers
retain nearly complete control over the location of the initial sale of their
products.292 The end product manufacturer either sells the product directly
to the consumers or it sells the product to a distributor or retailer that sells
it to the consumer. End product manufacturers can design and control the
distribution system for their products.293 “The component maker, in
contrast, has little control over where the product ends up.”294
If an end product manufacturer wishes to “sever its connection [with
any particular] state” in order to avoid being haled into that state’s courts,
it is a simple matter to refrain from marketing its product to that state and
to refuse to make sales in that state.295 Thus, the end product manufacturer
should be subject to personal jurisdiction wherever the product is sold and
causes injury.296 If the end product manufacturer employs one or more
distributors or sells the product to a retailer, it is easy to require, as a
condition of its agreement to permit the distributor to distribute the
product, that the distributor or retailer is precluded from making sales to
designated states.
To recap, where the location of an initial sale for an end product occurs
in the forum state, an end product manufacturer has presumptively
purposefully availed itself of the forum state where the product causes
injury in the forum state.297 On the other hand, where the location of an
292
By referring to the location of the initial sale, I mean the handing off of the product from
manufacturer or an authorized distributor or retailer to the consumer. I do not mean unauthorized sales
or resales.
293
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108, 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that Asahi may not have
designed, but was aware of the distribution system for its product).
294
Freer, supra note 39, at 29.
295
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“If [the
defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have
been simple—it could have chosen not to sell its [Internet news] services to Pennsylvania residents.”).
296
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (majority opinion) (“[T]hose who use Asahi components in their
final products, and sell those products in California, [should be] subject to application of California tort
law.”); see also Rodger D. Citron, The Case of the Retired Justice: How Would Justice John Paul
Stevens Have Voted in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 643, 666 (2012) (“J.
McIntyre was not selling components but rather a finished product, albeit through the use of a
distributor. This difference from Asahi supports the exercise of jurisdiction because J. McIntyre had
control over whether to attempt to sell, or not sell, its products in New Jersey.” (footnote omitted)).
297
Likewise, a distributor or retailer who makes sales of a product or provides a service in the
forum state has presumptively purposefully availed itself of the forum state where the product causes
injury in the forum state. Each of the participants in the sale of an end product can protect against
litigation in the forum state by requiring the purchaser to enter into a purchase agreement that contains
a forum selection clause.
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initial sale of an end product occurs in some state other than the forum
state, an end product manufacturer has presumptively not purposefully
availed itself of the forum state where the product causes injury in the
forum state. In order to overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must
establish additional conduct by the defendant indicating an intent or
purpose to serve the forum state market as described by Justice O’Connor
in her Asahi opinion. As discussed in the following section, conduct that
indicates an intent or purpose to serve the entire United States market
constitutes purposeful availment of each state where the product is sold
and causes injury.
E. Internet Sales and the World Wide Web
Purposeful availment by economic actors who make sales over the
Internet or promote their brand or product on the World Wide Web also is
best understood by consideration of the ability to sever a connection with a
particular state. Consider the examples that concerned Justice Breyer
when drafting his opinion in Nicastro:
But what do those standards [set forth in Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion] mean when a company targets the world by
selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if,
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns
the products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com)
who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the
company markets its products through popup advertisements
that it knows will be viewed in a forum?298
If a company makes initial sales of its products to consumers by direct
Internet sales, the company can elect not to make sales to consumers who
are physically located in disfavored states. The company might simply ask
the residency of the purchaser or require verification from the purchaser
that they do not reside in a disfavored state. Alternatively, the company
could elect to make sales to consumers from all states, but refuse to ship to
customers in disfavored states. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2005
decision in Granholm v. Heald,299 wineries are not allowed to ship to
residents of states that prohibit direct shipment of alcohol to consumers.
Many wineries still make Internet sales of their wine to consumers, but
they refuse to ship to residents of particular states.300

298

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
544 U.S. 460, 492–93 (2005).
300
See, e.g., Shop/Shipping, VINASA, http://www.viansa.com/index.cfm?method=storeproducts.sh
owList&productcategoryid=65271df0-911e-ca9a-6938-5c68dc82ca7a (last visited July 8, 2012) (listing
shipping restrictions for Viansa winery); State Shipping Laws for Wineries Portal, WINE INST.,
299
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Unlike in-store sales by brick-and-mortar retailers that have a physical
presence in a particular state, retailers who choose to sell products over the
Internet have purposefully accessed a nationwide pool of potential
customers. Internet retailers also have an additional, effective tool for
avoiding purposeful availment of disfavored states beyond simply the word
of the purchaser. The advent of geolocation technology allows the
operators of “[i]nternet sites to automatically and accurately identify a
user’s geographic location.”301 Thus, Internet sales would allow a
manufacturer to implement effective policies to avoid a disfavored
forum.302
Internet poker sites, for example, have used geolocation technology to
prevent users located in disfavored forums from accessing their services.303
In one lawsuit in Kentucky, the judge ordered the seizure of the domain
names of 141 Internet gambling sites; the seizure was ordered subject to
rescission once the sites installed a “geographical block [capable of]
block[ing] and deny[ing] access to their on-line gambling sites . . . [by] any
users or consumers within the territorial boundaries of the
Commonwealth” of Kentucky.304
If a manufacturer consigns sales of its products through an
intermediary—like Amazon.com—who receives and fulfills the orders, the
manufacturer can require as a condition of the consignment that the
Internet retailer honor its choice not to sell and ship its products to
consumers in disfavored states.
Geolocation technology is particularly useful because it helps Internet
http://www.wineinstitute.org/initiatives/stateshippinglaws (last visited July 8, 2012) (showing a map of
states where direct shipping is prohibited).
301
Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 63 (2011)
[hereinafter King, Personal Jurisdiction]; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71,
91 (2006) (“The technology exists to identify the geographical location of prospective users (for
example, through the user’s IP address or digital certificates) and to deny entry to undesirable users.”
(footnote omitted)); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-location Technologies and Other Means of Placing
Borders on the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 110 (2004)
(stating that Internet users’ locations may be revealed by their IP addresses).
302
King, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 301, at 63 (“This capability—unavailable just a few
years ago—has begun to revolutionize Internet commerce and communication by enabling content
localization, customization, and access regulation on a scale previously thought to be impossible.”).
303
See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling’s
Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 58–59 n.101 (2010) (detailing online poker sites’
use of geolocation tools to block certain customers from accessing their servers); Jessica Welman,
PokerStars Blocks Washington Residents from Playing Online, BLUFF MAG. (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://news.bluffmagazine.com/pokerstars-blocks-washington-residents-from-playing-online-15911/
(discussing an Internet poker site’s decision to stop taking Washington state residents as customers in
the wake of a state supreme court decision outlawing online gambling).
304
Kentucky v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409, at *39 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Oct. 16,
2008), available at http://www.gpwa.org/news/Kentucky.vs.141.Internet.Domains.pdf.
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retailers target geographic markets—for example, by use of popup
advertisements—where their products will be particularly well-received.305
As one scholar has explained:
Because it is now technologically possible to restrict the
accessibility of Internet material to specific geographical
areas, applying a traditional analysis to nongeographically
restricted Internet activity yields a presumption that those
Internet actors purposefully avail themselves of every
jurisdiction they permit their virtual conduct to reach.
However, the widespread fear shared by many courts and
commentators that this application of unaltered traditional
jurisdictional principles will result in universal jurisdiction
over Internet actors is unfounded. Universal jurisdiction will
hardly be the inevitable outcome of applying traditional
principles, given the ability of defendants to avoid the
presumption of purposeful availment by employing
geographical restriction techniques and the role that the
“arising-out-of” and “reasonableness” requirements of the
analysis can play in limiting unwarranted assertions of
jurisdiction.306
As demonstrated above, because Internet retailers have the ability to
sever their connection with a particular state, there is presumptively
purposeful availment where they choose not to do so.307
F. Courts Should Adopt Justice Ginsburg’s Position That Marketing to
the Entire United States Constitutes Purposeful Availment of Each
State Where the Product Is Sold
Justice Ginsburg’s view that marketing to the entire United States
constitutes purposeful availment of each state where the product is sold
was accepted by three members of the Court and may be accepted by two
additional Justices.308 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, indicated that
he is open to a rule of broader applicability if presented with a case that
requires consideration of “relevant contemporary commercial
305
Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1962
(2005) (“[G]eolocation of users demonstrates that Internet participants actively target the user’s
jurisdiction or . . . [make a choice to] refrain from interacting with users located in particular places.”).
306
Spencer, supra note 301, at 75–76.
307
See Reidenberg, supra note 305, at 1962 (“In effect, the technological choice either to filter or
not to filter becomes a normative decision to ‘purposefully avail’ of the user’s forum state.
Technological innovation that enhances interactivity also shifts the burden from demonstrating that a
jurisdiction was targeted to showing that reasonable efforts were made to avoid contact with the
jurisdiction.”).
308
See discussion supra Part VI.
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circumstances” and of the “modern day consequences” of “changes in
commerce and communication.”309 Thus, state and trial courts should be
open to such a position.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must accept Justice Ginsburg’s
position. It is consistent with the concept that there is purposeful
availment when it was reasonably feasible for a nonresident defendant to
prevent contacts with a particular state, but the defendant chose not to do
so. It will also prevent absurd and unfair results. Consider the following
scenarios.
1. Scenario One
A U.K. manufacturer hires a U.S. distributor and asks the distributor to
distribute the product in New Jersey. The U.K. manufacturer targets New
Jersey businesses by marketing and promoting its product in hopes of
selling its product to them. New Jersey is the only market targeted by the
manufacturer and the only state where the product is sold. The marketing
efforts are successful; a sale occurs in New Jersey and the product—which
is defective—later injures a worker for the New Jersey business in New
Jersey.
All nine Justices would agree that such conduct constitutes purposeful
availment by defendant U.K. manufacturer because the defendant targeted
potential New Jersey customers.310
2. Scenario Two
A U.K. manufacturer hires a U.S. distributor and asks the distributor to
distribute the product in a five-state region (New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, New York, and Delaware). The U.K. manufacturer targets
businesses in the five-state region by marketing and promoting its product
in the hopes of selling its product to them. The five-state region is the only
market targeted by the manufacturer and the product is sold only in these
five states. The marketing efforts are successful; a sale occurs in New
Jersey and the product—which is defective—later injures a worker for the
New Jersey business in New Jersey.
309
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
310
Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (“Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in
conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.”); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Here, the relevant
facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court show no ‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in
New Jersey; and there is no ‘something more,’ such as special state-related design, advertising,
marketing, or anything else. Mr. Nicastro, who here bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, has
shown no specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey.”); id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its machines in
the United States, ‘purposefully availed itself’ of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a
single State or a discrete collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all
States in which its products were sold by its exclusive distributor.”).
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Again, all nine Justices would agree that such conduct constitutes
purposeful availment of New Jersey because the defendant targeted
potential New Jersey customers.311
3. Scenario Three
A U.K. manufacturer hires a U.S. distributor and asks the distributor to
distribute the product in forty-nine states (including New Jersey) and the
District of Columbia. The U.K. manufacturer targets businesses in every
state except New York by marketing and promoting its product in hopes of
selling its product to them. The U.K. manufacturer took care to avoid
marketing its product in New York. The marketing efforts are successful,
a sale occurs in New Jersey and the product—which is defective—later
injures a worker for the New Jersey business in New Jersey.
Again, all nine Justices presumably would agree that the defendant’s
actions constitute purposeful availment of New Jersey because the
defendant targeted potential New Jersey customers while choosing to avoid
a disfavored forum in New York.312
4. Scenario Four: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
A U.K. manufacturer hired a U.S. company to act as its “exclusive
distributor for the entire United States.”313 The U.K. manufacturer did not
instruct its distributor to avoid particular states. Instead, the defendant
designed and manufactured the product to conform to United States
specifications and instructed the distributor to sell its product “anywhere in
the United States.”314
The U.K. manufacturer marketed its product in the United States by,
among other things, attending sixteen years worth of annual trade shows
held in New Orleans, Orlando, San Antonio, and San Francisco.315 At the
trade shows, the U.K. manufacturer exhibited its products, hoping to reach
anyone interested in the machine in the United States.316 The marketing
efforts were successful. A sale occurred in New Jersey to a New Jersey
business, and the product—which was defective—later injured a worker
for the New Jersey business in New Jersey.317
In this case, six Justices determined that the defendant’s actions did not
constitute purposeful availment. As Justice Kennedy noted, “These facts
may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that J.
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Id. at 2792.
Id.
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Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
314
Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 578, 593 (N.J. 2010).
315
Id. at 579.
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Id. at 578–79
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Id. at 577–78.
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McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”
This argument is illogical; it is contrary to reason to conclude that a
manufacturer who endeavors to sell its product in every state has not
purposefully availed itself of any state.319 But even aside from this flawed
logic, it would have been easy for J. McIntyre to refuse to market its
product to New Jersey customers and to require its distributor to refuse to
sell its product to New Jersey customers. All J. McIntyre had to do was
make a contractual agreement with the distributor that the distributor
would not sell to New Jersey. Absent such an agreement, J. McIntyre
could refuse to engage the distributor. Had J. McIntyre done this, there
would have been no sales in New Jersey that subsequently led to its being
haled to court there.
318

IX. CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer opened his Nicastro concurrence by acknowledging
“that there have been many recent changes in commerce and
communication . . . which are not anticipated by [the Court’s]
precedents.”320 But it was more than fifty years ago that the Court
recognized that the expansion of commerce, the availability of longdistance transportation, and the increase in communication technology has
resulted in an expansion of the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and nonresidents.321 Since that time, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that the “limits imposed on state jurisdiction by
the Due Process Clause, in its role as guarantor against inconvenient
litigation, have been substantially relaxed over the years” due to the
increase in national and international commerce and the availability and
affordability of modern communication and transportation.322
The point here is not that the Court should modify its personal
jurisdiction doctrine to expand the exercise of jurisdiction over
318

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality opinion).
See Richards, Purposeful Availment, supra note 129 (“Under this rule, a defendant who reaps
the benefits of a national market is subject to jurisdiction [sic] only a single state; whereas a defendant
that asked its distributor to focus on sales in, say, a dozen states would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in all of them.”); Drobak, supra note 8 (“If the defendant had told its distributor to sell to
customers ‘in all 50 states,’ would the plurality have found the requisite intention to target New Jersey?
What if the defendant had told the distributor to sell to customers in Alabama and then listed the other
49 states by name? There is absolutely no difference between telling a distributor to serve the U.S.
market and the two examples just mentioned.”).
320
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
321
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
322
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“[I]t is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life
that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state
lines.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (“As technological progress has increased
the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction . . . has undergone a similar increase.”).
319
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nonresidents. Rather, the point is that the Court cannot base its personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence on a fiction. Today, commerce is often national
or even global. Corporations are, by their nature, driven by a desire for
profit. Like the U.K. manufacturer in Nicastro, end product manufacturers
generally want to sell their products anywhere and everywhere.323
McIntyre U.K. viewed the U.S. as a single market. If McIntyre U.K.
wanted to avoid New Jersey, it could have done so. Instead, McIntyre
U.K. chose to accept the risk of its product being sold in New Jersey. That
is purposeful availment. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Nicastro should
be short-lived because it is inconsistent with personal jurisdiction doctrine
and the reasoning behind the purposeful availment requirement.
On the other hand, component part manufacturers generally lack the
ability to control where their products are sold after they are incorporated
in an end product. Where a component part manufacturer makes a product
that is very popular because of its high quality, it will be incorporated into
end products manufactured by numerous end product manufacturers. It
will inevitably wind up in the hands of consumers in most or all fifty
states. That is not purposeful availment because the component part
manufacturer cannot “structure [its] primary conduct” so as to avoid
purposeful availment and to forestall being subjected to a lawsuit in a
disfavored forum.324
Component part manufacturers will have extra protection where
purposeful availment is established. End product manufacturers, by
contrast, will purposefully avail themselves of every state where their
products are sold and cause injury. This is consistent with the purposeful
availment requirement and it is the optimal result.325 End product
manufacturers can respond by limiting the states where their products are
sold. States might then compete to attract end product manufacturers, as
well as their distributors and retailers, to sell the product in a particular
state “by weakening their product liability law or otherwise tilting their
procedural and choice of law rules to favor defendants.”326 End product
manufacturers also could expand the range of states where they make their
product available by charging a greater price in states with less favorable

323
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This case is illustrative of marketing
arrangements for sales in the United States common in today's commercial world. A foreign-country
manufacturer engages a U.S. company to promote and distribute the manufacturer's products, not in
any particular State, but anywhere and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract
purchasers.”).
324
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
325
Klerman, supra note 265, at 34 (“[A] rule that allows the plaintiff to sue where she purchased
the product is likely to lead to the best results.”).
326
Id. at 4.
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laws.
And, of course, a finding of purposeful availment does not mean that
there is necessarily personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Justice Breyer will take comfort in the fact that a defendant can still argue
that it would be unfair to exercise jurisdiction despite the defendant’s
purposeful availment of the forum state.

327
See id. (“A jurisdictional rule which allowed plaintiffs to sue where they bought the product
(but not necessarily where the accident occurred) allows manufacturers to vary the price depending on
the legal characteristics of the state where the product was sold.”).

